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TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF FAMILY PRIVACY: 
THE SPECIAL CASE OF PEDIATRIC SIBLING 
TRANSPLANTS 
Doriane Lambelet Coleman† 
  A six-year-old girl suffers third-degree burns over eighty 
percent of her body. Her chance of survival with minimal scarring 
is said to depend on her identical twin sister’s availability as an 
organ source.1 There are other transplant options—including the 
parents—but because the twins’ skin is “equivalent,” a “sibling 
transplant” is likely to result in a better medical and aesthetic 
outcome for the burned twin.2 Her doctor thus proposes to harvest 
her healthy sister’s skin on “her backside from her bra line down 
to the bottom of her buttocks or possibly her thighs.” This 
procedure would be repeated up to three times in as many weeks. 
It would cause “‘permanent discoloration,’” and would feel like 
“‘a severe sunburn with blisters’” for “3–5 days with return to 
normality with[in] 10–12 days.”3 
 
 †  Professor of Law, Duke Law School. B.A., Cornell University, 1982. J.D., Georgetown 
University Law Center, 1988. This paper is dedicated to Katharine (Kate) Bartlett, Elizabeth 
(Buffie) Scott, and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse. Every generation of scholars stands on the 
shoulders of its predecessors and I have always known how lucky I have been to stand on theirs 
in particular. Perhaps more than anything else I have written, this paper reflects their combined 
influence: as I read them together, hopefully intelligently, they are largely responsible for the 
progressive concept of the child that I describe here. I am eternally grateful for their work and 
support. I am also very grateful to the people, research assistants, colleagues, and friends, who 
took the time to help me otherwise along the way: Dr. Philip M. Rosoff, Kathryn W. Bradley, 
Curtis A. Bradley, Thomas Main, Jim Coleman, Len Simon, Christopher Giroard, and Kenton 
Atta-Krah. 
 1 Samuel J. Tilden, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Using an Identical Twin as a Skin 
Transplant Donor for a Severely Burned Minor, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 87 (2005). 
 2 Verified Petition for Declaratory Judgment, In re S.C., No. 180564, at 3 (Ala. Prob. Ct. 
Jan. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Verified Petition] (on file with author). Although the girls’ full names 
have been published elsewhere, throughout this Article I have used only their initials. 
 3 Guardian ad Litem Report to the Court, In re S.C., Nos. 180564 & 180565, at 2 (Ala. Prob. 
Ct. Jan. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Guardian ad Litem Report] (on file with author). This report was 
filed by S.C.’s guardian ad litem (GAL) who opposed her use as a skin source. The Verified 
Petition described the surgery similarly:  
Harvesting the necessary skin from [S.C.] would entail removing a thin layer of skin 
from [S.C.]’s scalp, the backs of her legs in the thigh area, and possibly from her 
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  Concerned about the legal implications of harvesting skin from 
a healthy minor child, the hospital consults with outside advisors, 
including at the local juvenile court, who suggest that the 
procedure might constitute child abuse. Anxious to proceed, the 
parents thus choose to bypass that forum and file an action in 
probate to establish their right to use their healthy daughter’s skin 
to benefit her injured sister.4 There, they argue that the grafts are 
in the healthy child’s best interests, presumably because of the 
sisters’ close relationship.5 Her guardian ad litem argues 
otherwise: “[U]nder no circumstances will this ‘well-
child’ . . . escape these surgeries without immediate physical pain 
and trauma in addition to life-long physical skin damage 
appearance issues that create probable severe psychological and 
emotional damage.”6 The court, which goes to extraordinary 
lengths to establish its equitable jurisdiction,7 finds that, on 
balance, given the risks and benefits to both sisters, the parents 
have the right to authorize the surgeries.8 
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back. In order to complete the process several harvestings may be necessary and 
would be spaced approximately seven to ten days apart.  
Verified Petition, supra note 2, at 3. 
 4 Tilden, supra note 1, at 97.  
 5 Verified Petition, supra note 2, at 5. 
 6 Guardian ad Litem Report, supra note 3, at 4. 
 7 See Order on Petition for Declaratory Judgment, In re S.C., Nos. 180564 & 180565, at 2 
(Ala. Prob. Ct. Jan. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Order on Petition] (on file with author); see also infra 
notes 140–59 and accompanying text (discussing this analysis). 
 8 Order on Petition, supra note 7, at 3. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Parents hurt their children all the time. They hurt their children’s 
bodies, their feelings, their development, and their chances for 
happiness and success as adults, for reasons that include maliciousness, 
indifference, momentary or longer-term lapses of attention, competing 
priorities, a desire for their progeny’s success, religion, culture, 
psychological dysfunction, and outright incapacity. Indeed, childhood is 
marked in part by parentally-inflicted injuries, although some of us are 
luckier than others with respect to the degree to which we suffer or 
cause harm. 
Precisely for this reason, but also because of ideology, the 
government mostly does not get involved. As a practical matter, even if 
there were some way for the government to know each time a child is 
hurt by her parents, there simply are not enough public resources 
allocated to taking care of children for it to intervene and then to have a 
net positive effect in every case.9 Even if money were no object, 
however, this extent of state incursion into the family would be 
anathema in a political system and society that is premised on limited 
government, that privileges individual privacy in both its decisional and 
physical forms, and that not only protects but also celebrates its 
ideological, cultural, and religious diversity.10 Family privacy11 and the 
 
 9 See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children: The Ironic 
Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 413 
(2005); Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A Search for 
Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 987 (1975). 
 10 Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1207, 1212 n.31, 1223 (1999). 
 11 Family privacy can mean different things. See, e.g., id. at 1207 (family privacy means the 
right to freedom from state interference that belongs to the family as a unit or entity, rather 
than to its included individuals); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 
YALE L.J. 624, 634 (1980) (family privacy means freedom from state intervention in “intimate 
associations” among individuals); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family 
Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1247, 1254 (1999) (family privacy is essentially the same thing 
as parental autonomy since, “[w]hen we adopt a theoretical framework that endows any ‘unit’ 
of persons with ‘autonomy,’ or a ‘right’ to be free of state intervention, in practice, we are 
conferring unregulated authority on the dominant member within this closed community of 
persons.”). In this Article I mean for family privacy to signify the sphere of family life and 
parental decisions about family life that are free from state interference. 
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substantially overlapping doctrine of parental autonomy12 are the 
constitutional embodiments of this idea.13 
Of course, like other rights in this liberal democratic scheme, 
family privacy and parental autonomy are limited by the principle of 
ordered liberty, which “provides for freedom within assumed societal 
goals and values as opposed to freedom from assumed goals and 
values.”14 Based on this principle, the government will intervene in the 
family when parents harm their children in ways that transgress 
prevailing social norms and aspirations as these are expressed in the 
law.15 To use a cartographic metaphor that is prevalent in this context, 
prevailing social norms and aspirations are the tools that are used to set 
the outer boundaries of family privacy and thus also of parental 
authority to cause children harm.16 And particular harms are permitted 
or prohibited according to where they fall on the map thus drawn.17 
 
 12 See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, 57 DUKE L.J. 517, 
545–49 (2007); Woodhouse, supra note 11, at 1254. 
 13 Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 955, 959 
(1993) (“[T]he family acts as an important institutional check on the power of the state to mold 
citizens in its own image.”); id. at 996 (“[P]arental authority . . . is necessary for the 
development of responsible individuals who have been raised with a sense of belonging to 
distinct and diverse moral traditions.”); Fineman, supra note 10, at 1214 (concluding that 
“[t]his ideology of state non-intervention is rooted in idealization, but also references the 
perceived pragmatics of family relationships and the acknowledged limitations of legal, 
particularly judicial, systems as substitutes for family decision-making.”). 
 14 Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Seattle Compromise: Multicultural Sensitivity and 
Americanization, 47 DUKE L.J. 717, 718 (1998). 
 15 Id. at 719; see also Dailey, supra note 13, at 959, 992 (noting that “the family’s role in 
initiating children into political life suggests that there must be some constitutional limits to the 
degree of family diversity a liberal democracy may tolerate” and that “[t]he settled boundaries 
of parental authority inject a strong normative vision of the ‘good citizen’ into family life”); 
Fineman, supra note 10, at 1224 (noting that “[e]ntity privacy . . . denote[s] a line of non-
intervention drawn around on-going functioning relationships”); Lee E. Teitelbaum, The 
Family as a System: A Preliminary Sketch, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 537, 548, 556 (noting that “[t]he 
institutional idea [of the family] has normative content precisely because it grounds 
expectations about conduct,” and that “[a]t the most general level, family relations exist in a 
setting that includes legal and social norms that strongly influence the institutional idea of the 
family, the way families define the arrangements available to them, and the ways family 
members live their lives together”). 
 16 See, e.g., Dailey, supra note 13, at 965 (noting the historical construction of the family as 
“‘a little commonwealth’”); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 2401, 2453 (1995) (noting that “[e]xplicit legal commands [regulating the parent-child 
relationship] are limited largely to a series of preemptive rules that define the boundaries of 
parental discretion”); Teitelbaum, supra note 15, at 542 (recalling colonial history which 
described the family as “distinct from that other entity, the state, [which] must be given some 
decisional space” and describing a married couple as “form[ing] a precinct that stands apart 
from and is ordinarily closed to state authority”); id. at 546 (rejecting the conventional idea of 
“the family . . . as an island or refuge”); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: 
Meyer and Pierce and the Child As Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1051 (1992) 
(describing state incursions on family privacy and parental autonomy using language such as  
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Because prevailing social norms and aspirations are used to define 
the boundaries of family privacy and parental authority, as social norms 
and aspirations change, so do these boundaries. Thus, when society 
conceives of the child as being one with her parent,18 or in an implicit 
contractual relationship with her parent in which “the infant ‘agrees’ to 
obey the parent in exchange for the parent’s forbearance from allowing 
the helpless infant to perish,”19 or—like slaves or even a treasured 
object—as the property of her parents,20 or as the property of god whose 
fiduciary is her parent,21 the parent has quite a lot of freedom to hurt her 
child. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse has summarized some of the 
implications of the boundaries established according to these property-
related norms: 
Under Roman law, fathers possessed the power of life or death over 
their children. Even in the American Colonies, laws in many places 
provided capital punishment for a child who struck or cursed his 
parent, although there is no record of such sentences being carried 
out. Well into the nineteenth century, a father could enroll his male 
children in the army and collect the enrollment bounty, betroth his 
 
“patriarchal governance was being challenged in skirmishes on many fronts”; “patriarchy 
fought to maintain its ground”; “the boundaries of its kingdom were blurring”; “[p]rogressive 
reforms . . . pushed at the borders of the domestic realm”). 
 17 Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Role of the Law in Relationships Within Immigrant 
Families: Traditional Parenting Practices in Conflict with American Concepts of Maltreatment, 
in IMMIGRANT FAMILIES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 287, 290 (Jennifer E. Lansford et al. eds., 
2007) (explaining that governments develop “their definitions of [maltreatment] in the same 
way that they develop other values-based legislation . . . [, i.e., using a combination of] 
prevailing (majoritarian) norms and sometimes also the recommendations of experts in the 
field about what is needed to achieve public policy goals”); id. (explaining that the Supreme 
Court has for the most part accepted the states’ maltreatment rules as also setting the outer 
boundaries of parental authority to cause children harm); see also Coleman, supra note 12, at 
545–99 (further elaborating on the relationship between state maltreatment rules and the 
constitutional doctrine of parental autonomy). 
 18 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A Child-Centered 
Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 5 GEORGETOWN J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 313, 313 (1998) 
(describing this identity relationship as a source of the view of the child as property, i.e., “[f]lesh 
of their father’s flesh, children rightly belonged to the patriarch, to be worked, traded, and 
given in marriage in exchange for money”); id. (describing Aristotle as another source of this 
same view, i.e., “[t]here cannot be injustice towards that which is one’s own; and a chattel, or a 
child, until it is of a certain age and has attained independence, is as it were a part of oneself; 
and nobody chooses to injure himself (hence there can be no injustice towards oneself) and so 
neither can there be any conduct towards them that is politically just or unjust”). 
 19 Id. at 314 (describing Thomas Hobbes’s view of parental authority). 
 20 See id. at 313 (describing the property theory of parental authority over children as an 
aspect of “[t]he concept of human property, of which slavery was the most notorious vestige,” 
and as imagining “parental rights as being virtually absolute and an end in themselves, rather 
than as an outgrowth of parents’ responsibilities and a means to secure the well-being of their 
children”). 
 21 See id. at 314 (describing John Locke’s view that “God was the true owner of children. 
God created children and gave them into their parents’ care: thus parental powers were a form 
of trusteeship of the Creator’s property”). 
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minor female children to persons of his choice, put his children to 
work as day laborers on farms or factories and collect their wage 
packets. As recently as in 1920 a parent who killed a child in the 
course of punishment could claim a legal excuse for homicide in no 
fewer than nine states. A father had the power to decide where and 
with whom his child would reside, and to transfer his children by 
testamentary disposition to someone other than their mother.22 
However, when society rejects these property-related norms and re-
conceives the child as a “collective resource,”23 or as an individual 
worthy of respect in her own right who belongs ultimately to herself and 
whose parent is her fiduciary during the period of her infancy,24 the 
parent has quite a lot less freedom to hurt her child. In such a society, 
the parent is presumed to be her child’s fiduciary—her primary or “‘first 
best’ caretaker[]”25—because she is naturally inclined to protect her 
child’s survival and success and otherwise to act in her best interests.26 
Within this scheme, the state in its twin parens patriae and police power 
roles is viewed mostly as a “junior partner,” assisting the parent to raise 
her child up to be a healthy and responsible member of society, but also 
as a last check on the parent who might violate her fiduciary obligations 
by causing harm to the child that transgresses the boundaries of family 
privacy.27 
This last, most progressive, concept of the child and her 
relationship to her parent and the state is still largely aspirational. 
Nevertheless, it is expressed in modern law and also to a great degree in 
 
 22 Id.; see also Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child 
Development Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13 (2009). 
 23 Woodhouse, supra note 16, at 1051–52, 1054 (introducing the idea of the child as a 
“collective resource” whose “highest duty was no longer obedience to parents, but preparation 
for citizenship” and who was “not [the] private property of his parent, nor of himself, 
but . . . belonging to the community, the collective family”; and positing that this shift away 
from the view of the child as the property of her parents was in part responsible for the 
development beginning in the late nineteenth century of child welfare, child labor, and 
mandatory school attendance laws). 
 24 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 294 (1988) 
(arguing that the law should express a view of parenthood “based upon notions of benevolence 
and responsibility” rather than “in notions of exchange and individual rights”); Gregory A. 
Loken, Gratitude and the Map of Moral Duties Toward Children, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1121, 1149 
(1999) (citing Immanuel Kant on the child, her relationship with her parents, and their 
obligations to her); Scott & Scott, supra note 16, passim (demonstrating how the law’s 
structuring of the parent-child relationship is consistent with a fiduciary model); Woodhouse, 
supra note 16, passim (beginning her development of a “trusteeship” model of the parent-child 
relationship); see also PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON: EXPLORATIONS IN MEDICAL 
ETHICS 14, 24–26 (2d ed. 2002) (describing a fiduciary theory of the parent-child relationship in 
the medical and research settings). 
 25 SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 1 (4th ed. 2009) (using this 
expression). 
 26 See Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). 
 27 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 163–68 (1944); Coleman, supra note 12, at 
548–49, 616 (describing this relationship). 
COLEMAN.35.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/10/2014  2:22 PM 
2014] T E S T IN G  T H E  B O U N D AR IE S  O F F A MI L Y  1295 
 
the informal social norms that complement its terms. Thus, in contrast 
with earlier periods, a parent’s legal and cultural obligations today 
include not only assuring her child the basic necessities of life—food, 
shelter, and medical care—but also (among other things) a childhood 
free of labor and maltreatment, an education, and in cases of intra-
family conflict, focused attention on her physical, educational, 
emotional, and developmental best interests.28 
The goal of this Article is to situate the parenting practice described 
in the introductory illustration—the use of minor children as an organ 
source29 for their ill siblings, or “pediatric sibling transplants”—within 
this historical and theoretical context, with an emphasis on 
understanding how it is or can be justified in the current period. In the 
process, I hope to develop a more complete picture of the modern 
boundaries of family privacy. Sibling transplants are particularly, maybe 
even uniquely, illuminating of these boundaries because unlike most all 
other parenting practices they appear to have broad (albeit mostly tacit) 
societal support at the same time that the surgeries involved violate the 
strongest and least controversial of the norms at the core of the modern 
concept of the child and her relationship with her parents: The 
requirement that parents protect their children from unnecessary 
serious physical harm.30 In at least many instances, they also appear to 
violate parents’ obligation to do right by their children’s emotional and 
developmental wellbeing; although this latter obligation does not have 
the same normative or doctrinal weight as its physical counterpart, it is 
still a significant aspect of the progressive concept of the child and her 
relationships with her parents and the state. As a result, the use of 
healthy minor children as organ sources for their ill siblings is a puzzle 
that both tests the boundaries of parental authority and provides the 
basis for the development of important details about their contours. 
Specifically, the practice of using healthy minor children as organ 
sources presents as one of three possibilities: First, it presents most 
 
 28 See Coleman, supra note 12, at 614–19. 
 29 Throughout this Article I refer to healthy children from whom organs are harvested as 
organ “sources” rather than as “donors.” Although the latter term is more common, I use the 
former because I agree with the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American 
Medical Association that “donation” is not only a misnomer but also disingenuous in this 
context since “minors generally cannot give valid consent to donation,” and since (because of 
their age or the circumstances) they may not even be asked for or capable of giving their assent. 
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, THE USE OF MINORS AS ORGAN 
AND TISSUE DONORS: REPORT 3–I-93, at 1 (1993). 
 30 This practice is one of a number of medically unnecessary surgeries that include cosmetic 
and gender re-assignment surgeries, and male circumcision. All are alike in that they are 
generally (if only tacitly) accepted at the same time that they violate the prohibition against 
physical abuse of a child. See Coleman, supra note 12, at 553–59 (describing de facto exceptions 
to child maltreatment law). The use of healthy children as organ donors for their ill siblings is 
most probative of the boundaries of family privacy, however, the case is more difficult to make 
here than it is in these other contexts that the surgery is in the donor child’s best interests.  
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easily but also most unsatisfactorily as an important relic of the 
historical concepts of the child as property and of parents as sovereigns 
of the kingdom that is the family. Second, it may reflect a particularly 
strong set of traditional and still-vital countervailing norms, in this case 
about family unity or interdependence, that manage in certain special 
circumstances to trump our commitment to a progressive sense of the 
child. Third, to the extent that a real commitment to the child as an 
individual requires recognition of the fact that her first nuclear family—
including in its composition and culture—is a necessary if not inevitable 
part of what constitutes her as a person, the practice may be seen as 
perfectly consonant with a most progressive sense of the child. 
Developing the latter two possibilities in particular allows for the 
establishment of grounded views not only about the practice itself but 
also, and most importantly, about the boundaries that they either 
transgress or amplify. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the relatively 
sparse legal history of pediatric sibling transplants beginning with the 
first cases decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court sitting 
in equity in 1957 through the extraordinary 2003 In re S.E. decision, 
featured in the introductory illustration. In contrast with previous 
summary renditions of this history,31 it provides a thorough analysis of 
the cases that makes clear that—contrary to the generally-held view—
they can no longer be considered the basis for parental or judicial 
authority to use healthy children as organ sources for their ill or injured 
siblings. Specifically, it situates the cases in a period of procedural flux in 
American law during which the state courts’ equity jurisdiction became 
increasingly narrow and thus decreasingly available to parents seeking 
authorization to proceed with pediatric sibling transplants. The 
procedural gymnastics engaged by the parties and legal actors in In re 
S.C. exemplify these difficulties in the modern era. They also exemplify 
the conundrum that the pediatric sibling transplant cases pose for the 
law: What is it about the practice of using healthy minor children as 
organ sources that causes it to remain not only sub rosa but also 
probably ultra vires, even as all of the relevant parties including lawyers 
and judges seem willing to pursue the option in particular 
circumstances? 
 
 31 This line of cases has been described previously; however, because the commentators 
apparently did not have access to the original case files, or because they did not appreciate the 
significance of the cases’ foundations in the courts’ historic but now largely diminished equity 
jurisdiction, they are incomplete or incorrect in important respects. See Robert J. Pristave & 
Katie L. Watson, Kidney Donation by Children and the Mentally Handicapped: Evolution of 
Precedent, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONCERNS IN TREATING KIDNEY FAILURE 7, 8–11 (Eli A. 
Friedman ed., 2000); Jennifer K. Robbennolt et al., Advancing the Rights of Children and 
Adolescents to Be Altruistic: Bone Marrow Donation by Minors, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 213 (1994). 
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Part II attempts to answer this question. It first elaborates on the 
principles that underlie modern law’s inevitable rejection of the practice, 
focusing on fiduciary theory and its doctrinal application in the states’ 
battery, consent, and maltreatment laws. It then develops the arguments 
from family unit and interdependence and obligation theories in 
support of the right of parents to use their healthy minor children as 
organ sources for needy family members. It closes with an analysis of 
the practical and normative implications of the awkward status quo for 
children who would be used as organ sources, and for the law’s capacity 
to draw the boundaries of family privacy. 
Part III argues that the boundaries of family privacy should and 
will continue to be drawn according to fiduciary theory and its 
associated norms and aspirations; competing norms and aspirations 
about the child as property and the family as a unit are practically and 
ethically weak by comparison and also unlikely to gain sufficient 
currency in the modern context. It joins scholars who respect fiduciary 
theory’s privileging of the child’s physical integrity but who also have 
urged a commitment to the child’s emotional and developmental 
interests: Doing so is controversial for many of the same reasons that 
explain the law’s reluctance generally to recognize emotional harms, and 
yet it is necessary to assure that the fiduciary enterprise is meaningful. 
Finally, it applies these principles to the special case of pediatric sibling 
transplants, arguing that the law must take an express stand on the 
practice to assure that the healthy child who would be used as an organ 
source is adequately protected—nonbinding medical protocols are 
insufficient for this purpose—and that the protections developed should 
bar transplants unless they are shown by clear and convincing evidence 
to be in the healthy child’s multiple interests. 
The Article concludes that resolving the issues raised by pediatric 
sibling transplants according to fiduciary theory will serve to clarify the 
boundaries of family privacy, and also to assure that they remain set to 
protect children against parentally-inflicted harm that cannot be 
justified according to their interests. Although parents will always have 
competing interests to consider, including their own and those of their 
other children, the state ought to be permitted to intervene in the family 
and its decisionmaking to protect the child who would be seriously 
injured as a result. 
I.     A LEGAL HISTORY OF PEDIATRIC SIBLING TRANSPLANTS 
Neither the medical practice of using living minor children as an 
organ source for their ill siblings nor the legal practice of allowing or 
disallowing the surgeries is well documented, at least not publicly. For 
example, online histories of transplantation abound, including those 
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involving living donors, but these histories typically omit or obscure 
references to living pediatric donors;32 courts that have been asked to 
authorize parents to consent to the transplants typically have not 
written or published their opinions and have impounded or sealed the 
accompanying records;33 and although the federal government 
publishes detailed annual data on living donations, it appears likely that 
underreporting of pediatric donations is the norm.34 Nevertheless, 
despite its sub rosa nature, it is possible to understand something of the 
history and scope of the practice from a combination of the clinical 
possibilities, related writing in the medical and legal literature, and 
available (albeit mostly unpublished) case law. From these sources, we 
can assume that, with the exception of surgeries whose short and/or 
long term negative physical consequences for the prospective donor 
cannot be ignored, the use of living minor children as organ sources has 
probably tracked the use of living adult donors.35 
 
 32 See, e.g., Donation & Transplantation History, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING 
(UNOS), http://www.unos.org/donation/index.php?%20topic=history (last visited Mar. 14, 
2014) (noting that the “[f]irst successful living donor liver transplant [was] performed” in 1989, 
but that it was not until 1998 that the “[f]irst successful adult-to-adult living donor liver 
transplant [was] performed,” and otherwise omitting references to pediatric transplantation). A 
clear exception is the proliferation, particularly in the last several years, of details and 
commentary about children donating bone marrow and stem cells. See, e.g., Comm. on 
Bioethics, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, 125 
PEDIATRICS 392 (2010) [hereinafter AAP Policy Statement]; Rebecca D. Pentz et al., The Ethical 
Justification for Minor Sibling Bone Marrow Donation: A Case Study, 13 ONCOLOGIST 148 
(2008); Michael A. Pulsipher, A Donor’s a Person, No Matter How Small, 119 BLOOD 2705 
(2012); Lainie Friedman Ross, In Defense of the American Academy of Pediatrics Policy 
Statement-Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, 56 PEDIATRIC BLOOD & CANCER 520 
(2011); Jan Styczynski et al., Risk of Complications During Hematopoietic Stem Cell Collection in 
Pediatric Sibling Donors: A Prospective European Group for Blood and Marrow Transplantation 
Pediatric Diseases Working Party Study, 119 BLOOD 2935 (2012); see also infra notes 79–80, 
124–125 (discussing this further). 
 33 See, e.g., Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 10–11; John A. Robertson, Organ 
Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 48, 53 
n.26 (1976). 
 34 Compare Organ Procurement & Transplantation Network, Living Donors Recovered in 
the U.S. by Donor Age, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/step2.asp (Step 1: “Choose Category” select “Donor” 
and “Choose Organ” select “All”; Step 2: follow “Living Donors by Donor Age” hyperlink) 
(including detailed numbers for all organ transplants from 1988 to 2012) (last visited Mar. 19, 
2014), with infra notes 124–25 and accompanying text (discussing prevalence of pediatric 
sibling transplants in the current period). Cf. Mary E. Olbrisch et al., Children as Living Organ 
Donors: Current Views and Practice in the United States, 15 CURRENT OPINION ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTATION 241, 242 & tbl.1 (2010) (providing some data but noting that it may not be 
complete); Lainie Friedman Ross & J. Richard Thistlethwaite, Jr., Minors as Living Solid-Organ 
Donors, 122 PEDIATRICS 454, 456 (2008) [hereinafter AAP Clinical Report] (same). 
 35 I do not mean to suggest that the numbers of healthy children used as organ sources 
track the numbers of adult donors; because of the administrative and procedural hurdles in the 
way of the former, if not also because of a continuing squeamishness about the practice, it is 
likely that the numbers are not at all the same. See, e.g., AAP Clinical Report, supra note 34, at 
454–55 (suggesting that “[a]lthough rare, children do serve as [solid-organ] donors” and 
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A.     The Early Equity Decisions 
Although it is likely that skin grafts were taken from healthy minor 
children to benefit their injured siblings earlier in the twentieth 
century,36 the first documented uses of minor children as organ donors 
appear to have involved kidney and bone marrow transplants between 
identical twins starting in the late 1950s.37 Professor William Curran of 
Boston University was the first to describe the origins of the kidney 
cases in the legal literature, in an article published in 1959: 
The first successful homotransplantation of a kidney in 
identical twins was performed at the Peter Bent Brigham Hospital in 
Boston in 1954.38 In this case the twins were adults. 
In 1956 the same hospital was confronted with [three] requests for 
similar procedures on identical twins who were minors. In each of 
the cases, one of the twins was suffering from chronic renal disease 
which would soon prove fatal if a kidney was not transferred from 
the healthy twin. For the hospital staff and its board of trustees the 
request raised, among many problems, a puzzling legal question. For 
every medical and surgical procedure performed in a hospital a 
consent is obtained to avoid the act being found a battery (and an 
assault, if the patient is conscious at the time). For minors, all 
hospitals obtain the consent of the parents or guardians. The 
question here was whether the consent, in fact, the request, of the 
parents was sufficient to warrant the hospital in proceeding. In most 
cases of minors, of course, parental consent is controlling in regard 
to medical treatment. However, in such cases the treatment is always 
potentially beneficial to the child. In homotransplantation of a kidney 
from a healthy twin to save the life of the sibling, there is a potential 
 
providing as examples that “at least 60 children younger than 18 years served as living kidney 
donors between 1987 and 2000, during which time approximately 40[,]000 live kidney 
donations occurred” and that “[a]t least 4 minors in the United States have served as living liver 
donors since 1989”); Olbrisch et al., supra note 34, at 242 (suggesting that the numbers of 
healthy children used as organ sources is actually on the decline as a result of increased 
attention to children’s “rights and protections” and “policies that advantage [children] in the 
allocation of organs from deceased donors”).  
 36 Homologous skin transplantation using adult donors was a reality before the kidney 
cases. See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (suggesting that a parent probably 
could consent to the use of her child as a skin donor for a needy cousin); Organ 
Transplantation, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organ_transplantation (last 
modified Mar. 9, 2014) (summarizing the history of organ transplantation). 
 37 History of Transplantation, FRED HUTCHINSON CANCER RES. CENTER, 
http://www.fhcrc.org/en/treatment/long-term-follow-up/FAQs/transplantation.html (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
 38 For a discussion of this pioneering surgery see M.J. Friedrich, Joseph Murray, MD—
Transplantation Pioneer, 292 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2957 (2004), available at 
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=200049 (noting that Dr. Murray received 
the Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine in 1990 for his development of the living kidney 
transplant procedure). 
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benefit for the sick twin, but what of the healthy donor? He will lose 
one of his two kidneys. At some time in the future such a loss could 
be highly detrimental should his remaining kidney be threatened.  
There being no law on the subject in Massachusetts or elsewhere the 
hospital trustees and the surgical staff were advised to seek a 
declaratory judgment.39 
Because the resulting three decisions—Masden v. Harrison,40 Huskey v. 
Harrison,41 and Foster v. Harrison42—were never published and were 
apparently under seal, Professor Curran’s account has long been the 
basis for further discussion of their particulars by courts and legal 
commentators.43 I describe this trilogy in additional detail below based 
on files I was able to obtain from the state’s archives. 
The decisions were rendered by the state’s Supreme Judicial 
Court44 sitting in equity in a single justice session.45 Consistent with the 
legal advice given to the Brigham Hospital and its surgical team, at the 
time, the courts’ equity jurisdiction was invoked when an injunctive 
remedy was sought or when there was an absence of law on the subject 
of the suit.46 Both of these doors to equity were open to the petitioners. 
 
 39 William J. Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 891, 892 (1959) (footnote omitted); see also Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 9 
(“Declaratory judgment is a procedural mechanism that allows parties . . . to go to court and 
receive a ruling on whether what they propose to do is legal.”).  
 40 No. 68651 (Mass. Eq. June 12, 1957) (decision on file with author). 
 41 No. 68666 (Mass. Eq. Aug. 30, 1957) (decision on file with author). 
 42 No. 68674 (Mass. Eq. Nov. 20, 1957) (decision on file with author). 
 43 See, e.g., Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 9 n.3 (indicating that their account is based 
on the Curran article); Robertson, supra note 33, at 78 n.26 (same). 
 44 Massachusetts calls its supreme or highest court the Supreme Judicial Court. See Neal 
Quenzer & Francis X. Spina, Supreme Judicial Court, in 1 MASS. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., 
APPELLATE PRACTICE IN MASSACHUSETTS ch. 1 (3d ed. 2011) (summarizing the history and 
institutional role of this court). At least two previous authors commenting on the trilogy have 
misunderstood this point, suggesting erroneously that the cases were decided by lower level 
trial courts. See Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 9–10. Pristave and Watson critique the 
decisions for failing to set a clear standard that could provide guidance to parties and courts in 
the future. Id. at 10. It is likely they did not understand or notice the fact that the decisions were 
rendered by the court exercising its equity jurisdiction, which was (at least relative to law) 
intentionally standardless. See infra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the use of 
equity in this context and the history of equity jurisdiction generally). 
 45 Single justice sessions are used mostly in cases in which time is of the essence. See, e.g., 
Karen Hennessey et al., Interlocutory Relief in Child Welfare Cases, in 1 MASS. CONTINUING 
LEGAL EDUC., CHILD WELFARE PRACTICE IN MASSACHUSETTS ch. 12, § 12.2.1 (1st ed. Supp. 
2012) (noting the use of such sessions in child custody cases); see also Quenzer & Spina, supra 
note 44 (describing the court’s single justice session in general). 
 46 Historically, equity was “[a] system of jurisprudence collateral to, and in some respects 
independent of, ‘law’; the object of which [wa]s to render the administration of justice more 
complete, by affording relief where the courts of law [we]re incompetent to give it.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1990); see also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 22–23 (10th ed. 2009) (setting out the history of the equity courts); 
Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 
passim (2003) (providing a particularly detailed account of the historical division between law 
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That is, they all sought a declaration of the parties’ legal rights, and none 
of the three areas of the law implicated by the facts had directly 
applicable rules.47 Thus, the tort of battery and its consent defense as 
these apply to minors had not developed doctrine specifically on the 
issue of nontherapeutic procedures.48 The state’s child maltreatment law 
 
and equity and their procedural merger). Law was considered “incompetent” or “inadequate” 
in this context because it did not speak to the issue at hand, because the kind of relief or remedy 
sought, for example a declaratory judgment, an injunction, or specific performance, could not 
be awarded by a law court which could only award monetary damages, or because law’s then-
cumbersome procedures made relief inaccessible to the petitioner. KEVIN M. CLERMONT, 
PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 24–25 (2d ed. 2009). Thus, the equity courts assumed 
jurisdiction of cases—opened their doors to the petitioner—when one or more of these factors 
was at issue. When equity jurisdiction attached in this earlier period, the judge’s discretion was 
guided by (i.e., the standard for making the decision was) “fairness as contrasted with the 
strictly formulated rules of common law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra. Fairness was in 
the eye of the beholder, however; and thus this guidance was subject to the criticism that it was 
effectively standardless. As one early commentator described it, “‘Equity is a Roguish thing: for 
Law we have a measure, know what to trust to; Equity is according to the Conscience of him 
that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity.’” CLERMONT, supra, at 25. 
Judicial reforms involving simplification of procedural rules beginning in the 1800s resulted in 
the merger of law and equity courts so that today, in almost all states, the same judges “sit” both 
in law and in equity, and the combined courts (now usually called civil courts) are entitled to 
award both legal and equitable remedies. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra, at 541–45; Main, 
supra, at 464–76. The standard for deciding cases that were equitable in nature also evolved 
significantly, initially as a result of the critique against the standardlessness of the historical 
fairness and justice test, but then because law itself had become increasingly pervasive; areas of 
human interaction previously untouched or “inadequately” addressed were now dealt with in 
meticulous detail either by statute or by operation of the common law. See, e.g., infra notes 51–
59 and accompanying text (discussing the seminal pediatric sibling transplant case Masden v. 
Harrison, in which the court sitting in equity adopted a version of the law’s “best interests” 
standard to decide the case); infra notes 113–22 and accompanying text (discussing the 
increased statutory regulation of the court’s probate jurisdiction). Thus, where a court in an 
action seeking an equitable remedy previously could examine the substantive issues involved 
according to their inherent equities, today the rules of decision are typically detailed in the 
states’ and/or the federal government’s statutory and case law; and certainly, where their law is 
on point, a court cannot ignore its applicability. See, e.g., Marc E. Tarlock, Voluntary Departure 
and the Right to Reopen Removal Proceedings on the Merits, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 613, 635 
n.125 (citing Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 194 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Having concluded, 
however, that [the statutory provision] precludes judicial review . . . we cannot evade this 
statutory directive by resort to equity.”)). 
 47 Given that the medical procedure was novel and that the law generally evolves to address 
real controversies, this is not surprising. See Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 8. 
 48 The closest precedent was an out-of-jurisdiction (thus not binding) case, Bonner v. 
Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941), which suggested in dicta (which is also not binding) that 
a parent probably could consent to the use of her child as a skin donor for a needy cousin. On 
the facts, although the child himself had apparently consented to be used as an organ source for 
his cousin, his mother was not informed of the transplant before it took place, and thus the 
doctor at issue was found liable in battery. The case is typically understood to stand for the 
legally non-controversial proposition that parental consent is required before a non-emergency 
surgical procedure can be performed on a minor. See, e.g., Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 851 
F.2d 437, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Bonner for the rule that “[i]n the case of a minor patient, 
the relevant consent is that of the parents”). 
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was primarily focused on neglect.49 And the law’s overarching, 
individual-child-centered “best interests” standard had not been applied 
in an obviously analogous situation. This legal backdrop imposed some, 
but not particularly constraining, boundaries on the justices who were 
otherwise free to operate according to equity’s first principles of fairness 
and justice.50 That is, the justices clearly believed that they could not 
permit the parties to proceed in the absence of consent; and they 
apparently believed that it was a good idea, if not even required, that 
they find the surgery to be (also) in the interests of the healthy child. But 
their hands were not otherwise tied. 
The seminal case in the trilogy is Masden v. Harrison, decided in 
June of 1957.51 The parties in Masden, including the children, sought to 
establish the right of twin nineteen-year-old boys and their mother to 
consent to the removal of a kidney from the healthy twin (Leonard) to 
benefit his brother (Leon) whose own kidneys had failed; indeed, Leon 
was described as “fast approaching a terminal condition and the only 
hope of saving his life is to perform a kidney transplant operation.”52 
Because the surgery would obviously not result in any physical benefit 
to the healthy twin, the parties developed the two-pronged argument 
that the surgery was in his psychological best interest as it would allow 
him to do what he could to save the life of his treasured sibling, and that 
his psychological welfare was of overwhelming developmental 
significance. Specifically, they argued that  
if this operation is not performed and Leon dies . . . a grave 
emotional impact on Leonard would result. . . . [which] would be 
further aggravated by the realization that it was within his power to 
have saved the life of his brother had this operation been 
performed.53  
Lacking even a single close precedent to support the proposition that 
surgery could proceed on the basis of these non-physical interests, the 
parties, and ultimately the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, chose 
to rest the argument and decision on the United States Supreme Court’s 
then-recent, seemingly inapposite decision in Brown v. Board of 
 
 49 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 24 (West 1954) (defining the maltreated child as 
one “without necessary and proper physical, educational or moral care and discipline, 
or . . . growing up under conditions or circumstances damaging to [his] sound character 
development, or who lacks proper attention of parent, guardian with care and custody, or 
custodian, and whose parents or guardian are unwilling, incompetent or unavailable to provide 
such care”); see also id. (West 1957) (same). 
 50 See supra note 46 (describing the history of equity jurisdiction and its standards). 
 51 Masden v. Harrison, No. 68651 (Mass. Eq. June 12, 1957) (decision on file with author). 
 52 Id. at 2. 
 53 Id. 
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Education.54 In particular, to support its finding that “[s]uch emotional 
disturbance could well affect the health and physical well-being of 
Leonard for the remainder of his life”55 and thus that “this operation is 
[also] necessary for the continued good health and future well-being of 
Leonard,”56 the opinion in Masden cites the latter part of Brown in 
which the Court describes the developmental and lifelong impact of the 
social stigma and psychological injuries suffered by black children as a 
result of school segregation.57 Masden does not otherwise discuss 
Brown; however, the point implied by the citation appears to be that 
sometimes, psychological and developmental benefit (at least if these 
can be said also to implicate the individual’s future physical welfare) can 
justify enormous social and jurisprudential upheaval, such as that which 
was involved in desegregating the public schools and in allowing a 
parent to consent to the cutting open of a healthy child to remove an 
organ for someone else’s benefit.58 Ultimately, Masden held that “it is 
proper for the [surgeons] with the assistance of [the hospital] to perform 
the operation herein described with the consent of all the plaintiffs 
without incurring any civil liability to Leonard or any criminal 
prosecution.”59 
The second and third cases in the trilogy were Huskey v. Harrison60 
and Foster v. Harrison,61 decided by different justices just several 
months later, in August 1957 and November 1957, respectively. These 
cases apparently cemented both the declaratory judgment procedure as 
the vehicle to obtain lawful consent to perform pediatric sibling 
transplants and (at least in Massachusetts) the substantive right of 
 
 54 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Masden court did cite two other cases but neither was 
sufficiently helpful. See Masden, No. 68651, at 3 (citing Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. 
Cir. 1941) (suggesting that a parent might be able to consent to the use of her child as a skin 
donor); Reddington v. Clayman, 134 N.E.2d 920 (Mass. 1956) (concerning an unconsented-to 
blood transfusion)). 
 55 Masden, No. 68651, at 4. 
 56 Id. Specifically, the court noted that “in performing the operation the defendants are 
conferring a benefit upon Leonard as well as upon Leon.” Id. 
 57 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (noting that for young “negro” children, race-based segregation 
“generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts 
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone” and that “this finding is amply supported by 
modern [psychological] authority”). 
 58 Brown is often described as the first (or at least the first notable) decision to accept that 
psychological and developmental harm could have such far-reaching legal implications. See, 
e.g., Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 10 n.4; Carroll Seron, Foreword, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
419, 420–21 (2010). Given the concerns raised by commentators and judges in later pediatric 
sibling transplant cases about the value of psychological harm evidence, it is interesting that the 
Supreme Court’s reliance on this argument in Brown was also controversial from the start. See, 
e.g., John Hart Ely, If at First You Don’t Succeed, Ignore the Question Next Time? Group Harm 
in Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 215 (1998). 
 59 Masden, No. 68651, at 4. 
 60 Huskey v. Harrison, No. 68666 (Mass. Eq. Aug. 30, 1957) (decision on file with author). 
 61 Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674 (Mass. Eq. Nov. 20, 1957) (decision on file with author). 
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parents and physicians to use healthy minor children as organ sources 
for their ill siblings so long as judicial authorization was obtained in 
advance. The cases also appear to have cemented the factual 
prerequisites for judicial authorization in this early period, including an 
urgent need for a transplant, the likelihood that the transplant would be 
successful in saving the life of the ill sibling, a close genetic and personal 
relationship between the siblings, the likelihood that because of this 
relationship the healthy child would suffer grave emotional and 
developmental harm if she were not permitted to donate an organ, and 
the consent (in the colloquial sense of that word) of everyone involved 
including the children. Notably, neither the Masden nor the Huskey 
decision mentions the harms and risks inherent in the surgery on the 
healthy child;62 the requirement that these be relatively minimal only 
emerged in Foster, the final case in the trilogy.63 
Huskey involved a joint request by Dolores and Doris, who were 
almost fifteen, and their parents. Dolores was described as being within 
hours or days of death should she not receive a transplant, and the 
transplant itself was described as likely to succeed given that the girls 
were identical twins.64 In contrast with the Masden opinion, the Huskey 
opinion is short and cursory: It notes that everyone involved had 
consented to the surgeries, including Doris; that the surgeons and the 
hospital would not proceed in the absence of court approval because 
they had been warned that without such approval they “may be subject 
to civil liability and criminal prosecution”; that “if this operation is not 
performed and Dolores dies, there is the risk of grave emotional impact 
on Doris”; and thus that “this operation is necessary for the future well-
being of Doris and that in this respect performance of the operation will 
confer a benefit upon Doris as well as upon Dolores.”65 And it concludes 
as Masden did, that the operations could proceed without the surgeons 
or the hospital incurring any civil or criminal liability.66 Throughout, 
Masden is the only precedent cited by the Court. Masden’s own meager 
scaffolding, Brown v. Board of Education, thus disappears (forever, as it 
turns out) as a legal foundation for the right of courts to authorize 
parents to consent to the use of their minor children as organ sources 
for their ill siblings. Also gone without any comment is Masden’s 
suggestion—possibly also based in Brown and the evidence presented in 
that case67—that averting eventual physical harm (as a consequence or 
 
 62 Neither opinion or order references these harms and risks. 
 63 See infra note 71 and accompanying text (finally noting these inherent harms and risks). 
 64 Huskey, No. 68666, at 1–2. 
 65 Id. at 1–2. 
 66 Id. at 3. 
 67 For example, in its famous “Footnote 11” in Brown, 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954), the 
Court cited GUNNAR MYRDAL WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF RICHARD STERNER & ARNOLD ROSE, 
AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944), available at 
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manifestation of grave emotional suffering) is important to offset the 
physical injury that is organ retrieval surgery; from Huskey forward, 
there has been no mention of this equation in the available decisions. 
Foster v. Harrison involved a request by the children’s mother for 
authorization to consent to the use of her fourteen-year-old son Carl as 
an organ donor for his ill sibling Clyde, who was also fourteen.68 In 
contrast to the Masden and Huskey opinions, the Foster opinion appears 
to be both procedurally distinct in some of its aspects and also richer 
and more nuanced in terms of the analysis, particularly in its attention 
to matters of concern to Carl. Thus, it appears that the case was brought 
by the boys’ mother alone; at least the court did not emphasize the fact 
of their status as parties.69 The court noted that “[p]reliminary tests 
indicate that Carl and Clyde are identical twins”;70 that “Carl appears to 
be in good health and medical opinion is that no unusual risks are 
involved to Carl beyond the inevitable risk of a major surgical operation 
and the hazards incident to having only one kidney in the event of later 
injury to that one kidney”;71 that Clyde was in declining health and 
would die “in a relatively short period” unless he could get a kidney 
from his twin—that “[s]uch an operation is the only hope of saving 
Clyde’s life”;72 and that “[a]lthough the operation could be postponed 
for a time, it has a greater chance of success in saving Clyde if performed 
before Clyde’s condition reaches an emergency state.”73 Notably, the 
Foster court also undertook to document the basis for finding that Carl 
had consented: 
[Carl] is a boy of fourteen with good understanding and intelligence. 
He has been fully informed of, and understands the nature of the 
operation and its possible risks and consequences. He has talked with 
a donor of a kidney in a similar operation. . . . Carl and his mother 
 
https://archive.org/download/AmericanDilemmaTheNegroProblemAndModernDemocracy/
AmericanDelemmaVersion2.pdf. Among other things, Myrdal details the extraordinary extent 
of discrimination in education in the Jim Crow South, MYRDAL, supra, at 337–44, and then 
writes 
[m]ortality in all age groups is much higher among Negroes than among whites. 
Negroes suffer more from nearly all sorts of illnesses. We have shown that at least the 
major part of these differentials is not due to greater susceptibility on the part of 
Negroes but to the impact of economic, educational, and cultural handicaps, directly 
or indirectly imposed upon Negroes by discrimination.  
Id. at 344 (footnotes omitted). It is this portion of the Brown decision upon which the Masden 
court originally relied. 
 68 Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674, at 1–2 (Mass. Eq. Nov. 20, 1957) (decision on file with 
author). 
 69 Id. at 1. 
 70 Id. at 2. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
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desire that the operation take place and Carl’s consent to it is the 
result of his own decision, free from pressure or coercion, made with 
admirable courage, generosity, and appreciation of the factors 
involved.74 
And, perhaps because the likelihood of saving the ill patient’s life, and 
thus the payoff from the transplant, is not always as clear as it had been 
portrayed in Masden and Huskey,75 the Foster court also described in 
detail the benefits of the surgeries to Carl: 
I also find . . . (1) that if this operation is not performed and Clyde 
dies, there is danger of serious emotional impact upon Carl, and (2) 
that, because the risk of emotional disturbance will be reduced and 
because of the probability that Carl will be enabled by the operation 
to have the continued companionship of his twin brother, Carl will 
receive a benefit from the operation, and (3) that the operation, if the 
doctors decide to perform it, is necessary to Carl’s future welfare and 
happiness.76 
Foster’s contribution is subtle, but it is real: It does not obviously add 
new factors to those established in Masden—indeed, in its own citations 
only to Masden and Huskey it cements the trilogy as the only foundation 
for the right of parents to use their healthy minor children as organ 
sources for their ill siblings. However, in its evaluation of those factors, 
it does suggest that the nature of the transaction is more ambiguous 
than it appeared at least in the written decisions in the first two cases. It 
also suggests that it is important to acknowledge that ambiguity, and 
thus to focus attention on the physical and psychological implications 
for the healthy child, including particularly his mental capacity and 
stated desires. 
In the fourteen years between late 1957 and 1972, when the next 
publicly available decision was rendered, there is some legal activity on a 
related point—whether a court can authorize the transfer of a kidney 
from an adult incompetent to his adult brother77—but none that I could 
 
 74 Id. at 2–3. 
 75 See Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 11 (noting that both Dolores Huskey and Clyde 
Foster died within months of the transplants). 
 76 Foster, No. 68674, at 3. 
 77 See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (case in equity in which 
chancery court decided that it had authority to manage and to make distributions from the 
personal assets and estate of an adult incompetent; that an adult incompetent’s kidneys are 
among the assets over which it has control; that the doctrine of substituted judgment, applied 
using best interests principles since the individual had never previously been competent, was 
the governing standard; and that as applied in the case it was in the psychological best interests 
of the adult incompetent to donate a kidney to his brother because they were so close). Strunk 
becomes relevant to the modern cases because it provides the roadmap for getting into equity 
through the probate courts after it is abolished in other contexts. See supra note 46 and 
accompanying text (discussing the history and evolution of equity jurisdiction); infra notes 
129–36 and accompanying text (discussing this probate strategy). 
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find involving minors.78 Nevertheless, one can reasonably suppose that 
as medical transplant capability developed to include non-identical 
siblings and organs other than skin and kidneys, most notably bone 
marrow,79 minors were sometimes sought out as organ sources80 and 
courts were sometimes if not always asked either for pre-authorization 
or to ratify existing consents.81 In other words, the dearth of published 
or available judicial decisions is not a sign of inactivity either by 
surgeons or by courts given that lower level state courts rarely draft 
opinions to accompany their decisions, perhaps particularly when they 
are rendered in emergent circumstances; moreover, there is a 
documented inclination to seal the records in these cases in particular.82 
The 1972 case Hart v. Brown, decided by a Connecticut state court 
also sitting in equity,83 considered whether to permit the parent 
petitioners to consent to a sibling kidney transplant from their healthy 
seven-year-old daughter Margaret to her twin Kathleen.84 Consistent 
with the pattern established in the Massachusetts transplant trilogy, the 
girls’ parents offered psychiatric testimony focusing on Margaret’s best 
interests, suggesting that  
the donor has a strong identification with her twin sister. . . . that if 
the expected successful results are achieved they would be of 
immense benefit to the donor in that the donor would be better off in 
a family that was happy than in a family that was distressed 
 
 78 The literature does reference some additional but apparently still unavailable decisions. 
See, e.g., Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 10 n.5 (“[B]etween 1970 and 1973, the 
Massachusetts courts decided more than seven additional cases of incompetent kidney donors 
in unpublished opinions.” (citing Charles H. Baron et al., Live Organ and Tissue Transplants 
from Minor Donors in Massachusetts, 55 B.U. L. REV. 159 (1975))). 
 79 The first successful transfer of kidneys between fraternal twins and non-twin siblings, 
respectively, dates to 1959 and 1960. A Timeline of Kidney Transplantation, MED. U. S.C., 
http://waring.library.musc.edu/exhibits/kidney/Transplantation.php (last visited Mar. 14, 
2014). The first successful transfer of bone marrow between non-identical minor twins dates to 
1968. History of Transplantation, supra note 37; Kendra D. MacLeod et al., Pediatric Sibling 
Donors of Successful and Unsuccessful Hematopoietic Stem Cell Transplants (HSCT): A 
Qualitative Study of Their Psychosocial Experience, 28 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 223 (2003); see 
also AAP Policy Statement, supra note 32 (describing this history and analyzing the ethical 
implications of the practice generally). 
 80 As a group of medical commentators noted in the context of bone marrow and stem cell 
transplantation, because “[a] sibling is more likely to be a compatible donor than parents, 
relatives, or strangers,” as transplants “increase in number, so does the number of pediatric 
sibling donors.” MacLeod et al., supra note 79, at 223. 
 81 Both the available medical and legal literatures strongly encouraged this ex ante judicial 
review. See, e.g., Baron et al., supra note 78, at 161–62; Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 15. 
 82 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting this point and providing references). 
 83 289 A.2d 386, 387–88 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (discussing its decision to proceed in 
equity, and emphasizing the courts’ historical authority to invoke equity in the interests of 
legally incompetent persons and the sibling transplant precedents including the Massachusetts 
trilogy which were also based in equity). 
 84 Id. at 386. 
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and . . . that it would be a very great loss to the donor if the donee 
were to die from her illness.85 
Parting ways with the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the Hart 
court found only “limited value” in this testimony given “the ages of the 
minors.”86 Instead, the court chose to focus its attentions very 
differently, on “whether it should abandon the donee to a brief 
medically complicated life and eventual death or permit the natural 
parents to take some action based on reason and medical probability in 
order to keep both children alive.”87 In analyzing this question the court 
“balanc[ed] . . . the rights of the natural parents . . . . to keep both 
children alive” against “the rights of the donor child,”88 and ultimately 
affirmed the right of the girls’ parents to use Margaret as an organ 
source for Kathleen: 
[T]he operation on the donee is a necessity for her continued 
life; . . . there are negligible risks involved to both donor and 
donee; . . . to subject the donee to a parental homograft may be cruel 
and inhuman because of the possible side effects of the 
immunosuppressive drugs; . . . the prognosis for good health and 
long life to both children is excellent; . . . there is no known 
opposition to having the operations performed; . . . it will be most 
beneficial to the donee; and . . . it will be of some benefit to the 
donor.89 
With respect to Margaret in particular, the court noted that she was 
“informed of the operation and insofar as she may be capable of 
understanding she desires to donate her kidney so that her sister may 
return to her,”90 but otherwise gave little weight (as it said it would) to 
the psychiatric testimony. It also apparently ignored (or was never 
provided evidence detailing) the threshold injury that was the surgical 
intrusion itself. Instead, it emphasized only the likely physical 
implications of that surgery in the short and long term: 
Of 3000 recorded kidney operations of live donors, there is reported 
only one death of a donor, and even this death may have been from 
causes unrelated to the procedure. The short-range risk to a donor is 
negligible. The operating surgeon testified that the surgical risk is no 
more than the risk of the anesthesia. The operative procedure would 
last about two and one-half hours. There would be some minor 
postoperative pain but no more than in any other surgical procedure. 
The donor would be hospitalized for about eight days and would be 
 
 85 Id. at 389. 
 86 Id. at 390. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 391. 
 90 Id. at 389. 
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able to resume normal activities in thirty days. Assuming an 
uneventful recovery, the donor would thereafter be restricted only 
from violent contact sports. She would be able to engage in all of the 
normal life activities of an active young girl. Medical testimony 
indicated that the risk to the donor is such that life insurance 
actuaries do not rate such individuals higher than those with two 
kidneys. The only real risk would be trauma to the one remaining 
kidney, but testimony indicated that such trauma is extremely rare in 
civilian life.91 
Hart is mostly cited for being the only published decision out of 
any court to authorize the use of a healthy minor child as an organ 
donor.92 However, the case is ultimately most notable for its rejection of 
the Massachusetts court’s emphasis on the psychological best interests 
of the donee and its adoption instead of a balancing test that takes into 
account not only the interests of the healthy sibling but also those of her 
sister (in a chance at life) and her parents (in saving their ill child). It is 
also notable for its appointment of guardians ad litem (GALs) to 
represent the separate interests of each of the girls in this balancing 
process, and for its focus on community ethical norms (as described by 
a member of the clergy and evaluated independently by the court 
itself)93 as the foundation for its overarching approach. With respect to 
the latter, it is significant that, in a concluding paragraph, the Hart court 
returned to the fact that it was sitting in equity:  
Justice will be accomplished in this case. . . . To prohibit the natural 
parents and the guardians ad litem of the minor children the right to 
give their consent under these circumstances, where there is 
supervision by this court and other persons in examining their 
judgment, would be most unjust, inequitable and injudicious.94 
Two years later, in the 1974 bone marrow case Nathan v. 
Farinelli,95 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court itself adopted a 
version of the Hart court’s balancing test.96 Still sitting in equity, 
 
 91 Id. 
 92 The Texas Court of Civil Appeal’s 1979 decision in Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1979), involved a fourteen-year-old prospective donor; however, because the 
mother’s lawyer’s legal strategy involved having the child declared an “incompetent” so that 
they could get into probate court and avail themselves of the more favorable legal climate in 
that context, her status as a child was irrelevant to the decision. See infra notes 129–39 and 
accompanying text (discussing this strategy and its consequences). 
 93 Hart, 289 A.2d at 389–90. 
 94 Id. at 391. 
 95 Nathan v. Farinelli, No. 74-87 (Mass. Eq. July 3, 1974) (on file with author). 
 96 There is some evidence that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court actually adopted 
this standard earlier in the same year. The Farinelli opinion and order references a case, 
Camitta v. Schillinger, No. 74-18 (Mass. Eq. Jan. 31, 1974 and Mar. 8, 1974), which it says also 
used this standard. Farinelli, No. 74-87, at 6–7. I have not been able to confirm this. 
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perhaps for the last time,97 the court rejected its prior position that “a 
finding of benefit to the donor is essential, or that the absence of such a 
finding is fatal, to the allowance of such a transplant.”98 Indeed, it found 
that “[t]o require a finding of benefit to the donor, and particularly to 
accept a psychological benefit as sufficient, often seems to invite 
testimony conjured to satisfy the requirement by words but not by 
substance.”99 Not surprisingly, the petition to allow the transplant was 
deficient in this regard—“the evidence does not permit a finding that 
the procedure will be of any benefit to Toni”100—as the psychiatrist in 
the case had testified that “it can be hoped that serving as the donor may 
confer some psychological benefit upon Toni in later years but that it 
would be indulging in speculation to attempt to predict now whether 
that hope would be realized.”101 Thus, the Farinelli court found that 
a better approach . . . is to consider that the primary right and 
responsibility for deciding the delicate question of whether bone 
marrow should be taken from [six-year-old] Toni and transplanted 
in [ten-year-old] William is that of the parents with reference to both 
children. However, because of the possibility of a conflict between 
their responsibility for the care and custody of William and their 
similar responsibility for Toni, their decision to grant consent for the 
transplantation . . . is subject to review by a court under its broad 
equity powers.102 
Specifically, the court described its role as being to determine “whether 
the parents’ decision . . . is fair and reasonable in the . . . circumstances” 
and this is done by “weigh[ing] and balanc[ing] the individual interests 
of the two children.”103 Thus, 
[o]n the one hand the court must consider the nature and urgency of 
William’s physical condition, his need for the transplant, the 
probable benefit to him from the transplant, the probable risks or 
consequences to him if the transplantation is withheld, and the 
availability and efficacy of alternative methods of treatment for his 
condition; and on the other hand it must consider Toni’s physical 
condition, the nature and extent of her physical participation in the 
 
 97 In its decision the court noted that the “bill in equity” is “now called a ‘civil action’ under 
the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1974,” that is, post-
filing but immediately before the hearing. Farinelli, No. 74-87, at 2. 
 98 Id. at 6. 
 99 Id. at 7. Citing the dissent in Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969), and Curran’s 
1959 Article, supra note 39, the court added, “I prefer the approach of the psychiatrist who 
testified in this case that she would be speculating if she ventured any opinion about the 
psychological effect of either allowing or preventing the intended donor from furnishing the 
bone marrow which is to be transplanted.” Farinelli, No. 74-87, at 7. 
 100 Farinelli, No. 74-87, at 3. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 10. 
 103 Id. at 11. 
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transplant, and the probable and possible risks and consequences to 
her by reason of her participation.104 
In this case, the parents’ decision to subject Toni to surgery to remove 
her bone marrow for William’s benefit was determined to be “fair and 
reasonable as to Toni” because the risks inherent in that procedure were 
outweighed by the benefits that would inure to William from the 
transplant.105 Specifically, the risks as to Toni were described as 
“minimal. . . . consist[ing] of possible adverse reactions to general 
anesthesia, and possible infection.”106 (As was the case in Hart, the 
Farinelli court did not address the physical harms inherent in the 
procedure itself.)107 On the other hand, William was suffering from 
aplastic anemia, which was likely to be fatal unless he could get a bone 
marrow transplant; such transplants were not a cure, but at the time 
they were said to be of benefit in fifty percent of the cases. Toni was the 
only bone marrow match they could find.108 Although not directly on 
point, the court also inferred that “it will be a source of comfort, 
satisfaction and psychological benefit to the parents to know that a 
transplant is performed for William whose chances of survival without 
it are dubious at best.”109 
Farinelli is particularly notable both for following the Hart court’s 
substantive approach to deciding these cases using a combination of 
parental rights and responsibilities principles and a balancing test 
involving consideration of the two children’s independent interests; for 
rejecting psychological best interests testimony as speculative, at least on 
facts involving prospective donors who are not yet adolescents; and for 
its procedural history, including especially its expansion of the role of 
the healthy child’s GAL. Although the Hart court also used GALs, 
Farinelli appears to have been the first case in which the healthy child’s 
GAL appeared as a party with full adversarial capacities. Thus, for 
example, Toni’s GAL—Garrick Cole—filed both cross- and counter-
claims, requesting, among other things, that the court order the hospital 
to obtain and pay for insurance to cover any additional harms Toni 
might suffer as a consequence of the procedure should it be 
authorized.110 Cole was also considered by the hospital to be an eventual 
proxy for consent purposes should the court decide the parents were 
incapable of providing lawful consent.111 It is probably not a coincidence 
 
 104 Id.  
 105 Id.  
 106 Id. at 3. 
 107 See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing this omission in Hart). 
 108 Farinelli, No. 74-87, at 1. 
 109 Id. at 3. 
 110 Id. at 12. 
 111 Id. at 2. 
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that Cole subsequently co-authored an Article about the role of GALs in 
this context.112 This Article remains an important template for 
academics and practitioners considering the issue how best to protect 
the interests of the healthy child in sibling transplant cases. 
B.     The Later Decisions in Probate 
In the period around the time Farinelli was decided, a few related 
developments were beginning to influence the way courts could treat 
requests for authorization to use of minors as organ sources for their ill 
siblings. First, as harked in Farinelli itself,113 state legislatures were 
continuing to reduce the scope of the judiciary’s equity jurisdiction. 
This happened in different states at different times, but of particular 
note here, at some point the courts’ substantive equity powers were no 
longer automatically triggered by a petition seeking a declaratory 
judgment, and even where the courts’ equity powers were still at issue, 
their authority to decide cases simply on the basis of fairness and justice 
principles was fading fast.114 As I have already explained, this happened 
in part because these principles had long been considered standardless, 
allowing individual judges to decide cases essentially on the basis of 
their personal inclinations, but also because the principal justification 
for resorting to equity—the absence of applicable law—was mostly no 
longer available.115 Indeed, by this time in American legal history, 
applicable law had developed in most areas including in the area of 
parental rights and the things parents could and could not do to their 
children. Thus, the states’ maltreatment laws had been redrawn 
beginning in the early-to-mid-1960s to shift the focus of the inquiry 
away from parents’ rights and motives to the right of the individual 
child to be free from parentally-inflicted serious (primarily physical) 
harm.116 (This shift was itself a product of developments in pediatric 
medicine117 and in the social movements of the civil rights era.)118 In 
doing so, the states began specifically to define unlawful “abuse” to 
include “non-accidental physical injury to a child,” and to include in 
that category such injuries as cuts, bruises, burns, and the like, which 
 
 112 Baron et al., supra note 78. 
 113 See supra note 97 and accompanying text (noting that the Farinelli court acknowledged 
the shift in the midst of its consideration of that case). 
 114 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the history of equity jurisdiction). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Coleman, supra note 12, at 550. 
 117 See C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 17 
(1962); Jessica R. Givelber, Note, Imposing Duties on Witnesses to Child Sexual Abuse: A Futile 
Response to Bystander Indifference, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3169 (1999). 
 118 See, e.g., Joel F. Handler, Continuing Relationships and the Administrative Process: Social 
Welfare, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 687, 694 (situating children’s rights movement in this context). 
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were not justified by an offsetting benefit to the child herself.119 Notably, 
apart from lawful corporal punishment, the states did not find, and to 
date have not found, psychological and developmental benefits to be 
sufficiently offsetting—even if these could be proven non-speculative 
and thus established to a court’s satisfaction.120 These developments 
made it increasingly difficult to obtain judicial ratification of parental 
consents to pediatric sibling transplants according to the procedures 
and standards established in the Massachusetts transplant trilogy and 
adapted in Hart and Farinelli. Thus, the question “whether this court 
can [authorize such a transplant] in the exercise of its equity powers”121 
increasingly had to be answered in the negative. In this landscape it is 
not surprising that proponents of the right to use minor children as 
sources of bone marrow for their ill relatives turned to state legislatures 
for statutory authorization; this alternative was successful, but only in 
two states, and only for bone marrow.122 
So what did parents, doctors, hospitals, and their lawyers do? The 
answer is not clear. That is, although the older medical literature 
consistently advised doctors and hospitals to get judicial authorization 
in advance of a transplant procedure involving a minor donor,123 I have 
found nothing in either the medical or the legal literature that explains 
 
 119 See Coleman, supra note 12, at 549–52; Doriane Lambelet Coleman et al., Where and 
How to Draw the Line Between Reasonable Corporal Punishment and Abuse, 73 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 115–16 (2010). 
 120 See Coleman, supra note 12, at 569–70. 
 121 Nathan v. Farinelli, No. 74-87, at 4–5 (Mass. Eq. July 3, 1974) (on file with author). 
 122 See ALA. CODE § 22-8-9 (1975) (permitting some adolescent minors to consent to a bone 
marrow donation so long as this is “for the purpose of bone marrow transplantation”; and 
providing that a “parent or legal guardian may consent to such bone marrow donation on 
behalf of any other minor.”); WIS. STAT. ANN § 146.34 (West 2014) (permitting the parent, 
guardian, or legal custodian of a child under twelve to use a minor child as a bone marrow 
source for an ill sibling so long as certain conditions are met; and permitting a child who is 
twelve or older himself under certain circumstances to consent to a pediatric sibling 
transplant). That Alabama should be one of the states providing unrestricted authority for 
minors fourteen years of age and older to consent to donate their bone marrow (including to 
non-family members and for research) is not surprising given that it is also one of the few states 
that authorizes children beginning at this age to consent to general medical treatment. See 
Doriane Lambelet Coleman & Philip M. Rosoff, The Legal Authority of Mature Minors to 
Consent to General Medical Treatment, 131 PEDIATRICS 786 (2013) (discussing ALA. CODE 
§ 22-8-9 (2014)). 
 123 See, e.g., Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 15. This admonition makes even more 
sense in the current legal landscape than it did at the time the Brigham defendants originally 
adopted the strategy. That is, the concern today is not merely that parents of a child who is ill or 
injured to the point of needing a transplant have an inherent conflict of interest that may void 
their consent to any use of a different child as an organ source, it is also that the law clearly 
defines as abuse an intentional, unnecessary (to the individual herself) cut of the sort involved 
in these surgeries. Thus, even if one could imagine the conflict away, there is still another 
important barrier that requires consideration. The potential for legal liability in circumstances 
where the donor child would complain is thus more salient. Given this, it is troublesome that 
the American Academy of Pediatrics would adopt the position that authorization from a court 
is no longer necessary. See infra notes 177–78 and accompanying text (discussing this move). 
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how such authorizations could be obtained or that discusses the 
metaphorical brick walls that are the legal doctrines that now stand in 
their way. Thus, although it is likely that hospital general counsels and 
their outside lawyers know what works on the ground in their particular 
locales, the broader story must be pieced together from a combination 
of the few cases that have seen the light of day since Hart and what we 
know of some hospitals’ internal procedures and experiences. 
As a threshold matter, although there is some indication that the 
numbers may be in decline, it is clear that minors continue to be used as 
organ sources for their ill siblings.124 It is likely that healthy children are 
most often used as bone marrow sources given how relatively acceptable 
this procedure seems to be.125 It is also probably true that healthy 
children continue to be used as kidney sources for their ill siblings;126 
indeed, one can reasonably surmise that the number of kidney 
harvesting procedures involving pediatric patients likely increased after 
the surgery became laparoscopic and thus less medically intrusive and 
risky for the donor in the operative and post-operative periods.127 
Finally, one can speculate that healthy children already have been or 
(because the medical possibilities are there) likely will be used as sources 
for other organs that are presently harvested from living adult donors; 
according to the federal government’s Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network these include livers, lungs, pancreases, 
intestines, and hearts.128 
 
 124 See Olbrisch et al., supra note 34, at 242 (providing data on the numbers of healthy 
children used as organ sources in the current period and also claiming that these numbers may 
be on the decline); see also supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text (providing additional 
references). 
 125 See AAP Policy Statement, supra note 32, at 392 (“Children often serve as hematopoietic 
stem cell donors, most commonly for their siblings.”). 
 126 See generally Olbrisch et al., supra note 34, at 242 (providing some available data on 
kidney harvesting); Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, passim (discussing the ethics and law 
involved in this procedure and giving guidance to medical providers engaged in the practice). 
 127 Michael D. Fabrizio et al., Laparoscopic Live Donor Nephrectomy, JOHNS HOPKINS BRADY 
UROLOGICAL INST., http://urology.jhu.edu/surgical_techniques/nephrectomy/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2014) (describing the benefits of laparoscopic kidney harvesting from the 
donor’s perspective). 
 128 Organ and Tissue Donation from Living Donors, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVICES, http://www.organdonor.gov/about/livedonation.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2014) 
(“Living individuals can donate one of the two kidneys . . . . one of two lobes of their liver. . . . a 
lung or part of a lung, part of the pancreas, or part of the intestines. . . . Surprisingly, it is also 
possible for a living person to donate a heart, but only if he or she is receiving a replacement 
heart.”). Notably, the Network’s online information includes the aside that “[g]enerally, living 
donors should be . . . between the ages of 18 and 60.” Id. (emphasis added). The Network’s 
transplantation data reveals that from 1988–2013, minors (seventeen years old or younger) 
made living donations of two hearts and fifteen livers. Living Donors Recovered in the U.S. by 
Donor Age, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/
latestData/step2.asp (last visited Mar. 14, 2014) (Step 1: “Choose Category” select “Donor” and 
“Choose Organ” select “All”; Step 2: follow “Living Donors by Donor Age” hyperlink; “Add 
Field to Report:” select “Organ (6 items)”). The Network’s references to living heart donors, 
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It is also clear that motivated lawyers with the right facts can be 
quite creative in their use of the judiciary’s remaining equity 
jurisdiction. The 1979 decision in Little v. Little129 out of the Texas 
Court of Civil Appeals is exemplary in this respect. The petitioner in 
Little was the mother of two children, fourteen-year-old Anne and her 
younger brother Stephen. Stephen was suffering from end-stage-renal 
disease and needed a kidney transplant. Anne, who had Down 
syndrome, was apparently a match. A week before their mother 
petitioned for authorization to use Anne as an organ donor, she 
petitioned the probate court to have Anne declared “of unsound mind” 
and to have herself appointed as Anne’s guardian. This was done.130 
Although it is not unusual for a parent of a mentally disabled child to 
seek such declarations, unless the child has separate assets it is not 
obviously important to do so until she reaches the age of majority since, 
before then, her parents are already the “natural guardian[] of [her] 
person.”131 Thus, Anne’s mother did not need to be appointed 
“guardian” to make all decisions for her including the decision “to 
consent to surgical intrusions upon [her] person.”132 The problem, 
however, was that the right of “natural guardians” (parents) in the latter 
respect are “limited to the power to consent to medical ‘treatment.’”133 
And the Little court was clear that 
[e]ven ascribing to the word “treatment” its broadest definition, it is, 
nevertheless, limited to “the steps taken to effect a cure of an injury 
or disease . . . including examination and diagnosis as well as 
application of remedies.”  
We cannot accept the guardian’s argument that a donor 
nephrectomy constitutes medical treatment for the donor. In this 
case the ward’s mental incompetency results from the fact that she 
suffers from Down’s Syndrome . . . . [and] the guardian does not 
contend that removal of a kidney is a medically acceptable method of 
curing or treating Down’s Syndrome . . . . We think it is clear that the 
 
and to the inclusion of children among those donors, is likely unrelated to the pediatric sibling 
transplant context. That is, it is likely that the donor children in these cases were also in need of 
medical need, and that harvesting their heart was necessary to address that need. See also AAP 
Clinical Report, supra note 34, at 454 (noting that “[l]iving donors have also provided segments 
of livers and, less frequently, lungs, pancreases, intestines, and skin for transplantation” and 
that “[a]lthough minors are more likely to be organ recipients than living donors, minors have 
served as living donors”). 
 129 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
 130 Id. at 494. 
 131 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 676(b) (West 2013) (repealed 2014) (“If the parents live 
together, both parents are the natural guardians of the person of the minor children by the 
marriage, and one of the parents is entitled to be appointed guardian of the children’s estates.”). 
 132 Little, 576 S.W.2d at 495; see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602–03 (1979); Coleman, 
supra note 12, at 545–49; Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 122. 
 133 Little, 576 S.W.2d at 495. 
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medical procedure authorized by the probate court in this case 
constitutes “treatment” of the ward’s brother, Stephen, and that the 
proposed medical procedure has as its purpose curing, remedying or 
ameliorating the condition of the proposed donee of the ward’s 
kidney.134 
What was apparently not so limited was the power of a “guardian” (who 
might in that state be a parent appointed as guardian) to “distribute” her 
ward’s “estate” according to equitable principles. That is, using the 1969 
Kentucky Court of Appeals decision in Strunk v. Strunk as a model,135 
Little’s legal strategy was apparently to get access to a court that would 
agree to imagine that a kidney was not part of a child’s “person” but 
rather a part of her “estate” so that it could be harvested from her body 
and “distributed” or “gifted” in ways that the law (which spoke only to 
“treatment”) otherwise would not allow. (The intellectual gymnastics 
really are quite astounding.) Of course Strunk itself involved an adult 
incompetent as donor, not a minor;136 however, this distinction was 
irrelevant to the Little court since it had based its jurisdiction in the first 
instance on the erasure of Anne’s status as a child. 
In any event, Little’s strategy was successful. Applying a hybrid of 
probate law’s traditional best interests and substituted judgment tests,137 
the court found that because Anne was close to and cared about 
Stephen, because she both missed him when he was away and knew she 
could help him, and because she would be happy if he lived and sad if he 
died, she would derive “substantial psychological benefits” from being a 
donor and she likely would have agreed to the donation had she been 
competent.138 Finally, perhaps in response to the analysis in Farinelli, 
the court added that although psychological prognostications can 
sometimes be speculative, the best interests test often governs legal 
outcomes and evidence of psychological benefit should not be ignored 
in that context.139 
The next and final available decision authorizing a pediatric sibling 
transplant is the 2003 decision in In re S.C., which is featured in the 
introductory illustration. In my view, it represents the pinnacle of 
creative lawyering in this area. Indeed, the petitioners’ jurisdictional and 
 
 134 Id. (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1673 (4th ed. 1968)). 
 135 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969); see supra note 77 and accompanying text (placing the Strunk 
decision in the chronology of sibling transplant cases). 
 136 Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 145. 
 137 Probate law has traditionally used best interests analysis in cases where incompetents 
have never been competent; substituted judgment analysis is used where incompetents have 
previously been competent and thus where there is evidence of how they would decide the issue 
themselves. See, e.g., Little, 576 S.W.2d at 497–98. 
 138 Id. at 498–500. 
 139 Id. at 498–99. 
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related procedural arguments, adopted wholesale by the Alabama 
probate judge in the case, arguably crossed both ethical and legal lines. 
Recall that the case involved a six-year-old girl, J.C., who had been badly 
injured in an accidental fire at her family’s home.140 At the time J.C.’s 
surgeon began contemplating skin transplants from her identical twin 
sister S.C., the third-degree burns, which covered eighty percent of J.C.’s 
body, were considered life threatening.141 According to Professor 
Samuel Tilden’s superbly detailed account of the case, 
[a]fter the hospital administration was informed of the proposed 
harvesting, the hospital medical director obtained a “curbside” 
consultation from a pediatric ethicist in Ohio, who opined that 
performance of the harvesting in Sydney would be tantamount to 
child abuse. Thus, the hospital administration’s initial information 
cautioned against going forward with the harvesting 
procedures. . . . After the [hospital’s own] ethics committee’s 
[contrary, positive] recommendation, the hospital’s attorneys 
proposed seeking judicial determination in juvenile court, but later 
reported that “feedback” for petitioning in juvenile court would not 
be greeted enthusiastically by the judiciary. . . . [M]aybe the concept 
of child abuse and neglect had not been fully put to rest.142 
In fact, the lawyers’ inquiry to the juvenile court made perfect sense 
since, by 2003 when the matter was being evaluated, Alabama, like other 
states, had already prohibited parentally-inflicted, non-accidental 
physical injury to a child; this law was administered by the juvenile 
courts (or the equivalent in states with different nomenclatures).143 In 
 
 140 See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text (introductory illustration); see also Tilden, 
supra note 1, at 88 (describing the accident). 
 141 Tilden, supra note 1, at 88 (explaining that “only her head, hands, and intertriginous 
areas were spared. Doctors estimated that [she] had a 30–50% chance of survival.”). Tilden 
emphasizes, however, that by the time the procedures were performed, J.C.’s life was likely no 
longer in jeopardy. Id. at 87–88, 107–09. 
 142 Id. at 97. Professor Tilden’s Article is an excellent summary of the facts of the case and an 
analysis of the ethics and law on the subject of pediatric sibling transplants generally. 
 143 ALA. CODE § 26-14-1(1) (1975) (defining abuse as “[h]arm or threatened harm to a 
child’s health or welfare,” and explaining that “[h]arm or threatened harm to a child’s health or 
welfare can occur through nonaccidental physical or mental injury, sexual abuse or attempted 
sexual abuse, or sexual exploitation or attempted sexual exploitation”). Section 26-14-3(a) 
provides explicitly that hospitals and related medical providers are required to report suspected 
abuse to the authorities in circumstances where it is suspected, including when they are “called 
upon to render aid or medical assistance to any child.” Id. § 26-14-3(a). Professor Tilden 
suggests that “[a]s much of the case law applicable here derived from probate or circuit court 
decisions, a recommendation to petition the juvenile court to hear this case seemed misplaced.” 
Tilden, supra note 1, at 97. As I explain above, this is incorrect since, by 2003 the equitable basis 
for the prior sibling transplant decisions (both those rendered in probate and in the circuit 
courts) had diminished so substantially that it was formally unavailable. Turning to the juvenile 
court was by then the right thing to do. See supra notes 113–22 and accompanying text. That 
the court had to engage in extraordinary contortions to establish its jurisdiction illustrates this 
point particularly well. 
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any event, concerned about the welfare of his patient but bound by the 
hospital’s decision to proceed only if “specific court approval of the 
harvesting procedures” was obtained in advance,144 J.C.’s “surgeon was 
seeking his own advice on the matter from a long-term acquaintance 
and judge in Louisiana, whose opinion was that, with [J.C.]’s life at risk, 
no court would hold against the parents’ wishes and the physician’s 
recommendation for the harvesting procedures.”145 
The conflicting legal opinions obtained by the hospital’s lawyers 
and J.C.’s surgeon likely reflected the parties’ different orientations to 
the problem: The lawyers and their client, the hospital’s administration, 
were concerned about liability, and as with most hospital counsels, they 
were likely risk-averse; thus, they were properly focused on the 
applicable law which included not only traditional battery and consent 
doctrines but also child abuse rules since parents cannot provide lawful 
consent to batteries that transcend abuse standards.146 The surgeon and 
his clients, J.C. and her parents, were concerned about the medical 
promise afforded by the transplants; thus, they were focused on 
ensuring they could somehow make the law work for them.147 
The problem was that the governing law was no longer friendly to 
petitioners in pediatric sibling transplant cases. Citing the 1969 
Kentucky state court’s decision in Strunk and the 1972 Connecticut 
court’s decision in Hart, Professor Tilden argues that a judge “could 
have found subject matter jurisdiction in the inherent powers of a court 
of equity, as other courts have done.”148 But this is wrong: These 
inherent powers had long since been abrogated by legislatures both in 
statutes carefully delineating the terms under which the courts’ 
remaining equity jurisdiction could be exercised, and in other legislation 
that mapped in increasing detail the state law boundaries of parental 
 
 144 Tilden, supra note 1, at 95. 
 145 Id. at 97. Tilden describes J.C.’s surgeon as being “frustrated” by “the hospital’s legal 
approach,” which “prompt[ed] him to recommend to the parents that they retain their own 
counsel. . . . [T]he surgeon felt that the hospital was more concerned with the potential long-
term liability from performance of the procedures than with the pressing needs of a severely 
burned child.” Id. Of course, long-term legal liability would attach if the procedures were 
performed in contravention of the state’s battery and related maltreatment laws (and the 
healthy child’s rights under those laws), and thus one could view the hospital’s trepidation as 
rights protective. 
 146 See Coleman, supra note 12, at 545–59 (describing the boundaries of parents’ medical 
consent authority). Notably, modern abuse standards do not allow for consideration of parental 
motivation except in the context of reasonable corporal punishment and medical treatment for 
the child herself. See supra note 119; infra notes 193–97. 
 147 I do not assume that the surgeon had no thoughts about S.C. Rather, I assume that, as he 
told the court, because the risks inherent in the medical aspects of the procedures were 
negligible in relation to the enormous benefits that would inure to J.C.—either life or 
significantly ameliorated physical aesthetics—he believed it made sense to focus on J.C. Of 
course, it was also his fiduciary obligation to his patient to be so focused. 
 148 Tilden, supra note 1, at 114 n.191. 
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authority. The Texas court’s 1979 decision in Little had already provided 
a sense of these new restrictions and the procedural moves that would 
henceforth be required to come within the bounds of equity.149 In 
Alabama, the applicable statute in 2003 was again the probate code,150 
but unlike the Texas code, this version contained an important (and 
apparently immutable) legal obstacle: It was explicit that children who 
have parents “with custodial rights” could not be the subject of the 
court’s probate jurisdiction;151 indeed, the purpose of the relevant 
provisions was to facilitate the appointment of guardians for children 
whose parents were unavailable because of incapacity, relinquishment, 
abandonment, or death.152 S.C. and J.C.’s parents were alive and well, 
and their physical and legal custody of their children was not in doubt—
they were a “normal” intact family in these respects. Thus, although the 
surgeon’s judicial acquaintance in Louisiana may have been correct to 
tell him that with a child’s life in the balance, “no court would hold 
against the parents’ wishes and the physician’s recommendation for the 
harvesting procedures,”153 the matter of figuring out how legally to 
accomplish this result remained a serious one. Indeed, a routine analysis 
of the relevant provisions would suggest that for the girls’ parents, the 
door to probate and thus to equity was sealed shut. 
What appears to have happened next is thus truly extraordinary:154 
The parents filed a petition in probate court on Thursday, January 2, 
2003, alleging jurisdiction under the probate code; describing the code’s 
remaining equity powers and suggesting that these permitted the court 
to “‘stretch forth its arm in whatever direction its aid . . . may be 
 
 149 See supra notes 129–39 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural wrangling in 
that case). 
 150 ALA. CODE § 26-2A-31 cmt. (1975) (“The ‘court’ referred to in this section is the probate 
court.”). 
 151 The statute initially defines the jurisdiction of the state’s probate courts broadly to 
include “all subject matter relating to estates of protected persons and protection of minors and 
incapacitated persons.” Id. § 26-2A-31(a). However, the official comment associated with this 
section is explicit that “[t]he subject matter jurisdiction described in this section affects the 
jurisdiction of the probate court only insofar as it applies to proceedings under this chapter and 
it does not purport to otherwise expand the jurisdiction of probate courts as established in other 
law.” Id. § 26-2A-31 cmt. (emphasis added). The only proceedings that relate to the protection 
of minors who are not also “incapacitated” are guardianship proceedings, and those provisions 
are clear that they do not apply to children whose parents have custodial rights. See id. § 26-2A-
73(a) (“The court may appoint a guardian for an unmarried minor if all parental rights have 
been terminated or suspended by circumstances or prior order of a court having 
jurisdiction . . . .”); id. § 26-2A-73 cmt. (“The court is not authorized to appoint a guardian for 
one for whom a parent has custodial rights . . . .)”). 
 152 See ALA. CODE § 26-2A-73 cmt. (discussing these circumstances generally). 
 153 Tilden, supra note 1, at 97. 
 154 Given the limitations inherent in the probate code, it is my opinion that this explanation 
of the case’s procedural history is the only way to understand the court’s assumption of 
jurisdiction. It can be pieced together from a careful review of the filings, the court’s order, and 
the relevant provisions of the code. It is also discussed in Tilden, supra note 1, at 113–15. 
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needed;’” and arguing that in this instance its aid was needed to 
authorize them to consent to the skin harvesting procedures because it 
was in S.C.’s best interests to support J.C.155 Four days later, on Monday, 
January 6, the court determined that the conflict of interest faced by the 
parents—having to choose between their burned daughter’s life and/or 
circumstances and their healthy daughter’s welfare and physical 
integrity—made it impossible for them to be proper parents to and to 
make decisions in the best interests of either daughter, and thus, the 
girls effectively had no “parents.”156 This first determination unsealed 
the door to probate. The next step was to appoint “guardians” for the 
girls who could act and make decisions in their best interests.157 In a 
second, but this time truly inexplicable contortion, the court on the 
same day, January 6, named as “guardians” these very same individuals 
who had just been declared incapable of conflict-free, best interests 
decisionmaking.158 Thus, the girls whose parents were unavailable to the 
point that they could be said to have no “parents” had their parents as 
“guardians.” The papers contain no discussion of how this 
transformation in name managed also to restore their on-the-ground 
fiduciary capacities. 
Presumably, concern over the parents’ actual (as opposed to legal) 
capacities was never the point. The Verified Petition makes clear that 
they were purposeful and directed throughout the legal proceedings, 
and that their goal—to get legally effective signatures on the hospital’s 
consent forms so that they could proceed with the transplant—would be 
accomplished however they had to describe themselves in the process. 
Indeed, S.C.’s GAL characterized them as being “hugely in favor” of the 
harvesting the day after the petition was filed, which he found to be 
“understandable by anyone” given that they had been told that it would 
result in a “substantial mortality reduction for J.C.”159 The fact that the 
court made them guardians on the same day it declared them to be too 
conflicted to function as parents also makes clear that it never doubted 
their capacities, notwithstanding that finding otherwise was necessary to 
establishing its jurisdiction. 
The substantive aspects of the case are not nearly so tricky although 
they are notable. The petition for declaratory judgment filed by the girls’ 
parents acting in their capacity as guardians alleged that: 
 
 155 Verified Petition, supra note 2, at 1–2, 4 (citing Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 387 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 1972)). 
 156 Tilden, supra note 1, at 114. 
 157 Letters of Guardianship, In re S.C., No. 180564 (Ala. Prob. Ct. Jan. 6, 2003) (on file with 
author). 
 158 Tilden, supra note 1, at 114. 
 159 Guardian ad Litem Report, supra note 3, at 2. 
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S.C., [J.C.]’s identical twin sister, is the best available source of skin 
for the skin grafting procedures necessary to save [J.C.]’s life. . . . [A] 
successful graft from [S.C.] would reduce the probability of [J.C.] 
dying from her wounds and attendant complications (i.e. infection) 
from approximately sixty percent (60%) to approximately ten 
percent (10%). . . . [J.C.’s surgeon] is of the opinion that the 
harvesting of the necessary skin from [S.C.] presents minimal risk to 
S.C. as the donor and is the last best hope for establishing permanent 
skin covering on [J.C.]’s wounds.160 
The petition cited as precedents Hart, Strunk, and Little, which together 
reflect all of the possible legal approaches to authorizing the parents to 
proceed—namely that it is in the source’s psychological best interests, 
that the harms and risks to the source are outweighed by the benefits to 
the recipient, and that it is within parents’ rights and responsibilities to 
make decisions for their children.161 Finally, the petition requested that 
the court find that “serving as a donor and undergoing the said 
procedures is in the best interest of the minor child, [S.C.]”162 
GALs were appointed to represent the two girls on Friday, January 
3.163 S.C.’s GAL performed his adversarial role admirably.164 He spent 
most of that day with J.C.’s GAL at the hospital meeting separately with 
the surgeons, the girls, their parents, a clinical psychologist on staff at 
the hospital, and a pediatrician who was also the medical director.165 His 
report to the court was drafted in the period between when he left the 
hospital on Friday afternoon and when he filed it with the court on 
Monday morning, January 6. It notes “[f]or the record” that he “does 
not contest the right or authority of th[e] court to issue . . . an order” in 
the case, suggesting that he may have been aware of but decided not to 
engage the jurisdictional controversy; it sets out the fact that he 
“strongly contest[ed] and oppose[d] the order . . . as not being in the 
best interest and welfare of the ‘well child’, [S.C.]”; and it distinguishes 
the three precedents cited by her parents on the grounds that two 
(Strunk and Little) involved true incompetents, not children, and the 
one that did involve a child (Hart) was not comparable because unlike 
kidney harvesting, “skin grafting surgery . . . has vastly different long-
term implications with physical body disfigurement or discoloration 
 
 160 Verified Petition, supra note 2, at 3. 
 161 Id. at 4. 
 162 Id. at 5. 
 163 See Appointment of Guardian ad Litem in the Matter of a Minor, In re S.C., Nos. 180564 
& 180565 (Ala. Prob. Ct. Jan. 6, 2003) (on file with author). 
 164 Although the court rejected the GAL’s analysis and conclusion, its order notes 
specifically that the GALs both exhibited “outstanding due diligence” and that S.C.’s GAL in 
particular was to be commended for his “specific opposition to [the] petition.” Order on 
Petition, supra note 7, at 2. 
 165 See Guardian ad Litem Report, supra note 3, at 1. 
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damage that is open and visible for all to observe as well as probable 
psychological damage to the minor ‘well child’, both in her childhood 
and as an adult.”166 The GAL focused on this last point over two-and-a-
half single-spaced typed pages of his report, which included the 
following submissions: 
It is proposed that [the same doctor] would be the surgeon for [S.C.], 
the minor donor and also for [J.C.], the minor donee. With all due 
respect to [this doctor], who seems to be totally committed to saving 
[J.C.]’s life, it is this GAL’s opinion that [he] has a direct conflict and 
cannot simultaneously serve in dual capacities representing that he is 
looking out for the best interest of [J.C.] and at the same time, 
looking out for the best interest of [S.C.]. This GAL submits . . . that 
if the “well child” had a separate surgeon, [she] . . . could not in all 
good conscience, verbalize that the proposed 2 or 3 skin removal 
surgeries on [S.C.] would be or even could be in her best interest. 
How could that happen when the short term effect on [S.C.] would 
be pretty severe pain and more importantly, the long term damage 
would be physical body permanent damage to the surgical areas that 
would have far-reaching psychological damage, both in childhood 
and even into adulthood—creating probable lifelong emotional 
issues including self-esteem issues, feeling different or less than 
because of the physical damage and barriers to intimacy with 
others.167 
The GAL did take J.C.’s injuries into account, but he was not willing to 
accept that they outweighed the harms and risks to S.C. simply because, 
as he understood the medical facts, “there [were] other reasonable 
options available” to J.C.’s parents that “d[id] not impose life-long 
physical and emotional scars to [S.C.].”168 He concluded that “the relief 
sought . . . is not equitable under the given circumstances.”169 
Nevertheless, on the same day the GAL submitted his report, the court 
signed an order permitting S.C.’s use as a skin source for her sister that 
was in its relevant parts a verbatim transcription of the parents’ original 
petition.170 
 
 166 Id. at 2. 
 167 Id. at 2–3. Others have noted the ethical issues implicated by having the same transplant 
surgeon or team work with the two children. See, e.g., AAP Policy Statement, supra note 32, at 
398. 
 168 See Guardian ad Litem Report, supra note 3, at 4. Professor Tilden’s evaluation is 
consistent with this conclusion. See Tilden, supra note 1, at 87–88, 107–09 (suggesting that in 
all likelihood the transplants from S.C. were ultimately designed to alleviate J.C.’s significant 
remaining pain and ameliorate her physical appearance). 
 169 See Guardian ad Litem Report, supra note 3, at 4. 
 170 See Order on Petition, supra note 7, at 2–3. 
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C.     The Law on the Ground Today 
This last Alabama decision and the five other cases I have described 
here are the only ones I could find records for that authorized pediatric 
sibling transplants in the period from 1957 to 2013.171 But we know that 
those are not the only cases since pediatric sibling transplants seem to be 
a medical commonplace.172 Indeed, given hospitals’ traditionally risk-
averse approach to potential liability, it is reasonable to assume both 
that judges around the country have and continue to be asked for 
authorization to proceed with pediatric sibling transplants and that, 
consistent with the view of J.C.’s surgeon’s judicial acquaintance from 
Louisiana, they have found ways to get around the legal obstacles in 
their jurisdictions. It is also reasonable to assume that judges in areas 
around major transplant centers proceed apace, either in reliance on old 
equity cases—mindlessly or willfully ignoring their irrelevance in the 
present period—or assuming without more that the law does not oppose 
authorizations so long as the procedural Is are dotted and Ts are 
crossed. Finally, it is reasonable to assume based on years of pro forma 
judicial proceedings that at least some hospital counsels or transplant 
teams are comfortable proceeding in the absence of judicial 
authorization: Where there is no one to complain about the transplant, 
it may be done as other surgeries are, within the auspices of medical 
privacy. This last scenario is perhaps most likely to be true with bone 
marrow transplants which are relatively noncontroversial in the current 
period despite their factual invasiveness.173 
 
 171 There are related cases with available decisions. See Howard v. Fulton DeKalb Hosp. 
Auth., 42 U.S.L.W. 2322 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1973) (decision on file with author) (authorizing 
kidney donation by fifteen-year-old mentally retarded girl to her mother); Curran v. Bosze, 566 
N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990) (denying father authority to require, against their mother’s wishes, his 
twins to submit to bone marrow compatibility testing and harvesting procedure for the benefit 
of their half-brother); In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (denying parent 
authority to consent to kidney donation by seventeen-year-old mentally retarded boy to his 
sister). Other commentators have written about these cases and their work contains additional 
references. See supra note 31. 
 172 See supra notes 34, 79–80, 124–28 and accompanying text (describing existing data on 
point); infra notes 174–80 and accompanying text (summarizing the position of the American 
Academy of Pediatrics on the practice). Especially within the medical community the practice 
seems to be an accepted fact and what is written about it is not whether it happens but rather 
how to proceed legally, ethically, and otherwise. See, e.g., AAP Policy Statement, supra note 32, 
at 393–94 (first describing the existence and history of the practice and then noting that “[m]ost 
pediatric physicians who perform transplants believe it is acceptable to expose minors to the 
risks of a stem cell donation when that donation offers a substantial prospect of benefit to a 
close family member and when proper consent is obtained”); Pentz et al., supra note 32, at 149 
(describing studies of minor bone marrow donors conducted post-harvesting); Pristave & 
Watson, supra note 31, passim (advising physicians about how to proceed with pediatric kidney 
harvesting within the bounds of the law). 
 173 AAP Policy Statement, supra note 32, at 392; infra note 199. 
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In what may be the most persuasive evidence of the existence of 
this practice on the ground, the Committee on Bioethics of the 
American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) in 2008 and 2010 for the first 
time took the public position that it is ethical to use a healthy minor 
child as an organ source so long as certain conditions are met;174 its 2008 
statement concerned solid organs175 and its 2010 statement concerned 
hematopoietic stem cells including bone marrow.176 In the context of its 
ethical analysis of stem cell harvesting, the Committee noted its view 
that it is a “fact that authorization of a stem cell donation by a minor is 
within the proper realm of parental decisionmaking” and suggested that 
such “donations” may take place simply based on this parental right—
that is, without judicial review.177 Specifically, the Committee took the 
position that “legal precedent for stem cell donation by incompetent 
adults and children is firmly established, [and thus that] as a general 
matter, donation by a minor should not require court review or 
approval.”178 It took essentially the same position with respect to the 
harvesting of solid organs.179 Finally, without any apparent sense of the 
law on the books or of the complicated legal history of pediatric sibling 
transplants—neither of which relates primarily to GALs—it opined that 
“[h]istorically, the primary value of the judicial review process was to 
ensure an independent advocate for the incompetent potential 
donor.”180 
 
 174 AAP Policy Statement, supra note 32, at 396. As I discuss in Part III, these conditions—
which largely mirror those proposed in 1993 by the American Medical Association’s Council on 
Ethical and Judicial Affairs—are very well-considered and ought to be guideposts as the law 
develops its own standards in this area. 
 175 AAP Clinical Report, supra note 34. 
 176 AAP Policy Statement, supra note 32. 
 177 Id. at 396. 
 178 Id. at 400. 
 179 AAP Clinical Report, supra note 34, at 459 (“Given that legal precedent for living organ 
donations by incompetent adults and children is firmly established, the AAP does not believe 
that every donation by a minor should require court approval.”). 
 180 AAP Policy Statement, supra note 32, at 400. What is especially curious about the AAP’s 
position is that it considers judicial oversight to be unnecessary in circumstances where the 
hospital has a “donor advocate” on the view that this advocate satisfies the concerns that begged 
the presence of a GAL in court. Id. This is incorrect for two reasons. First, as the cases described 
in this section make clear, judicial review is primarily intended to test parental authority, which 
is a legal question separate from (albeit informed by) the factual question of the healthy child’s 
interests. Second, according to the AAP’s own description, the model donor advocate does not 
and is not intended to play the same role as the GAL. The GAL’s role was specifically designed 
to be adversarial, to assure that someone with authority developed and presented the argument 
against using the healthy child as an organ source as a way to keep the adults in the case honest. 
See Baron et al., supra note 78, at 171. The work done by the GALs in Farinelli and In re S.C. 
exemplify this intended role. In contrast, the AAP’s model donor advocate is not expected to 
“judge . . . reasonable decisions being made by parents in an intimate family” but rather to 
“support,” “supplement,” and be “an ally” to parents who are otherwise preoccupied by their ill 
child’s circumstances; like the policy itself, the advocate is “meant to be quite deferential to 
parental authority.” Ross, supra note 32, at 520. What this means is that in places where the 
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This is actually the state of the law: As of this writing, two states 
(Alabama and Wisconsin) by statute authorize the use of healthy minor 
children as stem cell (but not other organ) donors, and one state 
(Michigan) by statute allows a mature minor to consent to donate a 
kidney (but not other organs), on the condition that the consent is 
approved by a court ex ante.181 Also as of this writing, there is only one 
published decision ever to take the position that a healthy minor child 
can be used as any kind of organ source (Hart);182 notably, this decision 
is not only old but also out of a lower state court (in Connecticut) and 
thus is not binding “precedent” there or anywhere else. There are only a 
few other available decisions on point (Masden, Foster, Huskey, and 
Farinelli out of Massachusetts and In re S.C. out of Alabama), but they 
are unpublished and thus are not binding “precedent” even in their own 
jurisdictions. Most importantly, as I have described throughout this 
Part, none of these decisions stands on anything firmer than quicksand 
in terms of their formal jurisdictional or precedential value: At the risk 
of minimizing the complexities at issue, for this purpose equity 
jurisdiction is essentially dead and neither Brown v. Board of Education 
nor Strunk v. Strunk can honestly support a modern claim for authority 
in this setting. On the other hand, although this was not always the case, 
it is quite clear today that parental rights and authority are constrained 
by the law in all jurisdictions that non-accidental physical harm to a 
child is prohibited; there are exceptions, most notably for treatment and 
for corporal punishment, but neither saving or ameliorating the life of a 
sibling nor the psychological benefits that might inure to a donor child 
are among them. It is thus difficult to understand the basis for the 
AAP’s view that “legal precedent for . . . donation by . . . children is 
 
AAP policy is implemented, not only is there no ex ante judicial review of the decision to 
proceed with the use of a child as an organ source, but there is also no one whose role it is to 
put proponents of the surgery to the test, to ensure that the decision in every case takes into 
account the separate interests of the healthy child and not only the medical emergency and 
attendant possibilities. The purpose of the adversarial process is to ensure that the ultimate 
decisionmaker has all of the facts, is aware of all of the arguments, and thus is most likely to 
arrive at the best result. See, e.g., Robert Gilbert Johnston & Sara Lufrano, The Adversary System 
as a Means of Seeking Truth and Justice, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 147, 147 (2002). Although the 
protocols associated with donor advocates suggest the criteria to be followed, some of which 
mirror what a GAL would consider, the protocols are insufficient in comparison with an 
adversarial process enforced by the courts because they are merely best practices, not 
mandatory, and because as written they tilt toward permitting the harvesting. See Ross, supra 
note 32, at 520 (“The donor advocate serves as an ally to both the donor child and his or her 
family, and is only empowered to prevent sibling donations in very rare circumstances.”). 
 181 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5105 (West 2014); see also ALA. CODE § 22-8-9 (1975);  
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.34 (West 2014). 
 182 Recall that Little, the only other published decision involving a minor, was based on the 
premise that the child was an “incompetent” and thus not subject to the usual rules governing 
children. See supra notes 129–39 and accompanying text (discussing this case). 
COLEMAN.35.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/10/2014  2:22 PM 
1326 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 35:1289 
 
firmly established” unless it is in the lived medical experience that the 
law and judges are either infinitely malleable or else irrelevant. 
II.     EXPLAINING THE STATUS QUO 
The legal history of pediatric sibling transplants is clear on two 
points: First, formal law, the law “on the books,” has long been 
uncomfortable authorizing the necessary harvesting procedures. This 
discomfort has increased markedly in recent decades to the point where, 
with some notable exceptions, it may be impossible today to obtain a 
declaratory judgment lawfully authorizing the surgery; the fact that a 
judge may provide it does not mean that it is legal.183 Second, healthy 
minor children continue to be used as organ sources for their ill siblings, 
sometimes with the assistance of lawyers and judges. The medical 
possibilities and the ethical norms of the medical profession (rather than 
law) appear to govern outcomes “on the ground.” This second part of 
the Article explores the reasons for the law’s discomfort with pediatric 
sibling transplants and the weighty countervailing interests that explain 
their persistence, and it evaluates the normative and practical 
implications of this status quo. 
A.     The Law’s Discomfort with Pediatric Sibling Transplants 
That the law is and has long been uncomfortable with pediatric 
sibling transplants is evident in its treatment of the practice beginning 
with the first recorded case in 1957 through the last available decision in 
2003. In that forty-six year period, courts that have been asked to 
authorize the use of healthy minor children as organ sources for their ill 
and injured siblings have mostly struggled to establish the substantive 
basis for authorizing the nontherapeutic procedures in general and then 
to identify the appropriate standard for making decisions in individual 
cases. Most recently, they have struggled as a threshold matter even to 
obtain jurisdiction over the parties. 
The reasons for this discomfort and the legal hurdles that result are 
clear and noncontroversial—at least within the discipline. United States 
 
 183 An act which is “beyond powers conferred . . . by law” is ultra vires. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1522 (6th ed. 1990). Governmental (including judicial) as well as private actors 
may be found to have acted ultra vires and thus to have their associated acts themselves 
declared null and void. See, e.g., Summit Media LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
574, 584 (Ct. App. 2012) (judge acting ultra vires); Hopewell Valley Citizens’ Grp., Inc. v. 
Berwind Prop. Grp. Dev. Co., 10 A.3d 211, 221–22 (N.J. 2011) (dissenting Justice explaining 
position that composition of court was unconstitutional and thus that “its acts are ultra vires”); 
ZYZY Corp. v. Hernandez, 345 S.W.3d 452, 459 (Tex. App. 2011) (same). 
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law is based in classical liberal theory and is thus fundamentally 
committed to the protection of individual rights. Among these rights, 
the law has long held that bodily integrity and decisional autonomy—
including particularly as autonomy relates to bodily integrity—are of 
paramount importance.184 The tort of battery and the doctrine of 
informed consent operationalize these rights by providing individuals 
with a cause of action against anyone who would seek to violate them. 
As Professor Dan Dobbs explains in his treatise on torts, 
[t]he central core of the battery rules is simple. Subject only to the 
most limited exception, the defendant must respect the plaintiff’s 
apparent wishes to avoid intentional bodily contact. Hostile, 
aggressive, or harmful touchings are batteries because the plaintiff 
wishes to avoid them. But the plaintiff’s right to avoid unwanted 
intentional contact does not depend upon the defendant’s hostile 
intent or even upon the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s wishes. A 
person is entitled to refuse well-intentioned medical treatment as 
well as the bumptious grapplings of an unwelcome swain. In a world 
full of uncontrollable events, all persons are at least entitled to 
prohibit unwanted intentional touchings of any kind.185 
Thus, as the Supreme Court of Illinois explained in Curran v. Bosze, a 
decision denying a non-custodial father the right even to have his 
children tested for compatibility with their half-brother who was dying 
of leukemia, “‘[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully 
guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the 
possession and control of [the individual’s] own person, free from all 
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable 
authority of law.’”186 This quoted language is from an 1891 decision of 
the United States Supreme Court. 
Of course because children need adults to take care of them 
physically, and because children lack the legal if not also the cognitive 
capacity to consent, these first principles apply differently to their 
circumstances. But this does not mean that the law denies children’s 
right to bodily integrity.187 Indeed, although this was not always the 
 
 184 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) (“The protections of substantive due process 
have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and 
the right to bodily integrity.”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (“The integrity 
of an individual’s person is a cherished value of our society.”); David G. Owen, Philosophical 
Foundations of Fault in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 201, 217–18 
(David G. Owen ed., 1995) (“[B]odily integrity interest is accorded a higher abstract value than 
property and economic interests [and] has a long and deep tradition in the law of torts.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 185 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 54–55 (2000) (footnotes omitted). 
 186 Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1323 (Ill. 1990) (alteration in original) (quoting Union 
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). 
 187 See, e.g., Rhonda Gay Hartman, Noblesse Oblige: States’ Obligations to Minors Living with 
Life-Limiting Conditions, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 333, 362 (2012) (“Although children and adolescents 
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case, today a parent’s rights to touch her child physically and to give 
proxy consent for others to do the same are formally linked to her 
responsibility to do so in the child’s individual best interests. In this 
respect, modern law conceives of parents as fiduciaries.188 As one court 
has explained, 
the parental right to control a child’s nurture is grounded not in 
any absolute property right which can be enforced to the detriment 
of the child, but rather is akin to a trust, subject to . . . [a] 
correlative duty to care for and protect the child, 
and . . . [terminable] by [the parents’] failure to discharge their 
obligations.189 
It takes a lot for the law to intervene in the parent-child 
relationship on the basis that the parent has failed to discharge her 
fiduciary obligations. Indeed, because the law presumes that fit parents 
act in their children’s individual best interests,190 unless there is a 
sufficient charge and evidence to the contrary, most parental actions 
and decisions—including those that are not actually in their child’s best 
interests—are beyond review.191 This presumption exists in part because 
the law does not want to second-guess parents as they proceed 
according to their often very different capacities and inclinations—in 
other words, the law intends to establish a wide range of permissible 
parenting and parental decisions.192 However, it does have a few 
categorical boundaries, and consistent with the law’s fealty to bodily 
integrity most relate to the child’s physical welfare. 
Of particular relevance to this Article, the law prohibits parents 
and those to whom they would delegate parental authority from 
intentionally causing or risking physical harm to a child. This 
prohibition is ensconced in the tort law of battery and in civil and 
criminal statutes prohibiting physical abuse; together, these laws create a 
coherent system that protects the child from physical injuries that have 
 
lack capacity for medical decision making by law, the value of personal dignity, including 
bodily integrity and self-identity, applies to all persons. Personal dignity is not limited to those 
having legal autonomy.”). 
 188 See supra notes 24–28; infra note 190 and accompanying text (elaborating on this idea). 
 189 Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1063 (Mass. 1978) (alterations in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 190 Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“The law’s concept of the family rests on a 
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for 
judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions. . . . [I]t has recognized that natural 
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.”). 
 191 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993) (“So long as certain minimum requirements 
of child care are met, the interests of the child may be subordinated to the interests of other 
children, or indeed even to the interests of the parents . . . themselves.”). 
 192 See supra notes 9–13 and accompanying text (discussing this political and legal 
principle). 
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not been established as being in her individual best interests. Thus, 
although parents were historically immune from tort liability for the 
harms they inflicted on their children, “[w]here the parent is guilty of an 
intentional [as opposed to negligence] tort, the courts [today] agree that 
the immunity is no defense.”193 Only batteries justified by discipline194 
and treatment195 continue to be privileged. Similarly, where a parent’s 
good faith (or lack of maliciousness) used to preclude state intervention 
in the family under the civil maltreatment laws and punishment under 
the analogous criminal provisions, today unless treatment or reasonable 
corporal punishment is at issue, parental motivation is irrelevant. 
Specifically to the point of the pediatric sibling transplant cases, neither 
the needs of a severely ill or injured brother or sister nor a psychological 
benefit to the child herself are sufficient to justify a parent’s or delegate’s 
intentional invasion of the child’s bodily integrity.196 As the Maryland 
Court of Appeals (the supreme court of that state) emphasized in an 
analogous context, the parent of a healthy child “cannot consent to the 
participation of [that] child . . . in nontherapeutic research or studies in 
which there is any risk of injury or damage to the health of the 
subject.”197 
As a doctrinal matter, cutting or piercing a child’s skin, flesh, and 
(depending on the kind of transplant) bone to the point necessary to 
remove an organ inevitably satisfies battery law’s definition of a 
 
 193 DOBBS, supra note 185, at 756; see also id. at 753–54 (describing the old rule that “parents 
and those in loco parentis could not be held liable for either intentional or negligent torts to 
their minor, unemancipated children,” the erosion of that rule, and that today 
“[c]ourts . . . allow[] recovery for intentional or willful torts, [even] where the immunity 
otherwise remains” (footnote omitted)). 
 194 Id. at 754. 
 195 See supra notes 39, 133–34 and accompanying text. 
 196 Apart from the law’s allowance for reasonable corporal punishment (which pre-dates all 
modern restrictions on parental authority) and the pediatric sibling transplant cases, there is 
only one state court decision arguably authorizing surgery on the basis that this was in the 
child’s psychological and developmental best interests. See In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 
675–76 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970) (holding that a mother who had consented to plastic surgery on 
her son’s face, but who refused to consent to the blood transfusions necessary to the operation’s 
success and the child’s survival, was guilty of child neglect), aff’d per curiam, 278 N.E.2d 918 
(N.Y. 1972). As I have written elsewhere,  
[t]he surgery itself was deemed necessary to cure the child’s apparently substantial 
cosmetic deformity so that he would have a chance to lead a more-or-less normal 
life. . . . Everyone’s interest at the time of the litigation was to fix his face so that this 
damage could be at least partially undone.  
Coleman, supra note 12, at 553 n.146. Sampson is an isolated case both because it has not been 
followed, and because it is otherwise idiosyncratic. It certainly cannot be relied upon for the 
proposition that “the law” permits surgery to benefit the child psychologically or 
developmentally. 
 197 Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001). For a detailed discussion 
of the Grimes case and in particular of the occasional collision between law and legal norms on 
the one hand, and science and medicine and their norms on the other, see Coleman, supra note 
12, at 578–90. 
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“harmful or intentional bodily contact”198 and civil and criminal 
maltreatment laws’ definitions of “physical harm,” even where these are 
conditioned by the requirement of “seriousness.”199 Thus, although the 
medical and bioethics literatures tend to ignore this threshold point to 
focus on the short- and long-term consequences (risks) of surgery 
including on the associated pain,200 for the law the bodily injury that is 
the surgery itself is central. Some if not all organ harvesting procedures 
may also fail those parts of the maltreatment definitions that are 
separately concerned with risk, but this is secondary.201 What this means 
is that the bodily injuries that are a necessary part of pediatric sibling 
transplants are only lawful if they fit within an exception to the 
prohibition against intentional physical harm. To the extent that 
discipline and treatment are the only two “clear and unquestionable” 
privileges in this area, and that the law requires such “authority,”202 the 
answer is negative.203 
The arguments that have garnered support in the line of pediatric 
sibling transplant cases discussed in Part I and in the medical, legal, and 
bioethics literatures204 simply do not work to bring pediatric sibling 
transplants within the range of legally permissible harms that might be 
inflicted on healthy children by their parents and their parents’ 
delegates: Contrary to the sentiments expressed in Farinelli, Hart, and 
 
 198 See DOBBS, supra note 185, at 54. 
 199 Coleman et al., supra note 119, at 114–17 (detailing the states’ definitions of physical 
abuse). All transplants involve subjecting the healthy child to surgery. Even the most minimally 
invasive and least risky organ donation surgeries—bone marrow and stem cell retrieval—
typically require the pediatric donor to undergo general anesthesia and tissue cutting and 
removal. See, e.g., The Bone Marrow Harvest Procedure: What Happens After the Procedure?, 
CLEVELAND CLINIC, http://my.clevelandclinic.org/services/Bone_Marrow_Transplantation/
hic_The_Bone_Marrow_Harvest_Procedure.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2014). Laparoscopic 
nephrectomy, the least invasive, least risky kidney harvesting procedure, is similarly serious; 
that is, after administering general anesthesia,  
[y]our surgeon will make 3 or 4 small cuts, usually no more than 1-inch each, in your 
belly and side. The surgeon will use tiny probes and a camera to do the surgery. 
Towards the end of the procedure, your doctor will make one of the cuts larger 
(around 4 inches) to take out the kidney. The surgeon will cut the ureter, place a bag 
around the kidney, and pull it through the larger cut.  
Kidney Removal, N.Y. TIMES HEALTH GUIDE, http://health.nytimes.com/health/guides/surgery/
kidney-removal/overview (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (citing Andrew C. Novick, Open Surgery 
of the Kidney, in CAMPBELL-WALSH UROLOGY (Alan J. Wein et al. eds., 9th ed. 2007)). 
Traditional kidney harvesting procedures (simple and radical nephrectomies) and other organ 
retrieval surgeries involve more invasive, and thus commensurately more serious, measures. See 
id.  
 200 Coleman, supra note 12, at 560–61. 
 201 Coleman et al., supra note 119, at 110, 114–15. 
 202 See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 203 Creative advocates may argue that being an organ source is “treatment” and that being 
required to be altruistic is “discipline.” Given the stingy state of the law in this area, neither of 
these efforts has been or is likely to be successful. 
 204 See supra Part I (describing these arguments); infra Part III (same). 
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In re S.C., parents do not have the responsibility and thus the right to 
decide to use one child as an organ source for another; by the terms of 
tort and maltreatment law (which largely describe the terms of related 
constitutional doctrine) this decision is outside the boundaries of their 
consent authority. Contrary to the position taken in the Massachusetts 
transplant trilogy, in Little, and in In re S.C., the healthy child’s 
psychological best interests cannot justify the physical harms and risks 
inherent in the harvesting surgery; the law is simply not designed to 
permit the elevation of the former over the latter. And most especially, 
contrary to the notion that was said to dictate the outcome in Farinelli 
and Hart, intentional physical harm to one child cannot be justified on 
the grounds that, on balance, the reallocation of organs within the 
family is in its best interests; it is no surprise that this approach was 
ultimately unsuccessful even within the otherwise renegade line of cases 
that are the sibling transplant decisions205 since it violates one of the 
most important principles of American law: That the individual be the 
basis for decision as to matters that concern especially her physical 
welfare. 
As the remainder of this Article suggests, this legal landscape is not 
beyond criticism. It does, however, explain the basis for the law’s 
longstanding discomfort with pediatric sibling transplants. Although the 
transplants may be justified by more holistic takes on personal integrity 
or by other-than-liberal social norms, they are impossible to reconcile 
with modern legal doctrine. 
B.     The Persistence of Pediatric Sibling Transplants Despite the Law 
The conundrum posed by pediatric sibling transplants is that they 
persist notwithstanding clear doctrine to the contrary and that mostly 
no one seems to intervene, including the legal actors who are 
responsible for administering the states’ tort and maltreatment 
definitions on the ground. The reasons for their willingness in particular 
to transgress the boundaries of their own authority—to act ultra vires 
and to bear the professional risks of that move—may be as simple as the 
unbearable plight of a dying child, the basic human instinct to save her, 
and the inevitable demotion or overwhelming of other weighty 
concerns. No one wants to have had the power to rescue the child and to 
have been the reason she died. With respect to those other weighty 
concerns, the most important is the welfare of the healthy child who 
would be the organ source. As to him, it has to be that his interests can 
 
 205 As far as I can tell, no other pediatric sibling transplant decision took this position; the 
decisions that followed Hart and Farinelli all reverted (at least formally) to a “best interests of 
the [healthy] child” analysis. See supra Part I (describing the line of available cases). 
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be demoted and overwhelmed because he is understood—at least in the 
moment and in contrast with comparable adults—not to be a full bearer 
of individual rights. But of course these explanations about instinct and 
expediency cannot be the basis for principled decisionmaking in law or 
in ethics. Thus, the cases and the literature suggest some better 
alternatives. 
The view that parents ought to be able to remove organs from 
healthy children to benefit their ill or injured siblings has been explained 
on the basis of two related ideas. The first is that intra-family interests 
balancing is an appropriate alternative to best interests analysis in cases 
where the premise of fiduciary theory fails; that is, where there is more 
than one child in the equation. This explanation appears to be a claim 
within the law—it suggests that existing rules are insufficient for or 
inapplicable to the special facts of pediatric sibling transplant cases and 
then proposes an approach to address that vacuum. In contrast, the 
second explanation is very much a claim outside of the law—essentially 
it is that “the law is an ass” because the parent-child relationship is 
better theorized as existing within a family unit made up of 
interdependent members than within liberalism’s collective of 
individuals. 
The first claim, that fiduciary theory and the “best interests” test 
are irrelevant in circumstances involving two or more children whose 
interests are diverse, is based on the practical point that in these 
circumstances it is impossible to act in the best interests of each child, 
and thus parents have no choice but to make a decision; they cannot 
simply abdicate their responsibility to decide.206 Moreover, it makes 
sense to allow them to make decisions based on an evaluation of the 
situation as a whole, including by balancing the interests of the two (or 
more) children at issue.207 
 
 206 No one has yet developed this point. However, it has been noted in the family and 
children’s law literature that fiduciary theory and the best interests test contemplate a parent-
child dyad, where the only conflict of interest that might arise is a conflict between the parent’s 
interests and those of the child. See, e.g., ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING 
FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 236 (1989) (“The case for 
legitimate departures from the best interest[s] principle as a guidance principle in decision 
making for children depends exclusively upon the fact that optimizing for the sick child may 
conflict with the legitimate interests of other individuals within the family.”); Loken, supra note 
24, at 1140–44 (elaborating on “[t]he difficulty of fulfilling parental duties for more than one 
child” and the implications of this problem for the best interests standard, and suggesting that 
“parental neglect of the child’s welfare [may be] justified” in circumstances where doing “‘good’ 
embraces all others, or even just the family unit (including siblings with their own needs)”). 
 207 Michael T. Morley, Note, Proxy Consent to Organ Donation by Incompetents, 111 YALE 
L.J. 1215, 1243 (2002) (“Many important decisions are normally made based on the best 
interests of the family—children take on after-school jobs, high school graduates forego 
attending expensive institutions of higher learning, close friends and significant others are left 
behind for a cross-country move. In poorer families, health care itself is rationed, and the cost 
of visits to the doctor’s office is balanced against the needs of others in the family.”). 
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This appears to have been the view of the courts that decided Hart, 
Farinelli, and In re S.C., all three of which rejected the best interests 
standard in lieu of an intra-child or intra-family balancing test. The 
courts in Hart and Farinelli were explicit in their use of this alternative 
approach. Thus, the question in Hart was not whether being a kidney 
source was in the best interests of the healthy child but rather “whether 
[the court] should abandon the donee to a brief medically complicated 
life and eventual death or permit the natural parents to take some action 
based on reason and medical probability in order to keep both children 
alive.”208 And to resolve this question the court “balanc[ed] . . . the rights 
of the natural parents . . . . to keep both children alive” against “the 
rights of the donor child.”209 Similarly, the question in Farinelli was 
“whether the parents’ decision [to use their daughter as a bone marrow 
source for their son] . . . is fair and reasonable in 
the . . . circumstances,”210 and the answer was had by “weigh[ing] and 
balanc[ing] the individual interests of the two children.”211 The Farinelli 
court also noted that “it will be a source of comfort, satisfaction and 
psychological benefit to the parents to know that a transplant is 
performed for [their son] whose chances of survival without it are 
dubious at best.”212 In re S.C. was not explicitly based on intra-family 
balancing—it purported to rest on a best interests (of the healthy child) 
analysis. But in fact the parties and the court paid only lip service to 
those interests.213 The various decisions that ultimately led to the 
transplant in that case—of the burned child’s surgeon to suggest the 
procedure, of her parents to proceed according to his suggestion, of 
their lawyer to pursue an extraordinary legal strategy to avoid the 
proper jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and of the judge to ignore the 
petition of the healthy child’s GAL and sign off on the entire 
transaction—plainly rested on an erasure of the harms and a 
minimization of the risks to the healthy child in relation to the harms 
that the injured child had already suffered as a result of the fire that 
caused her burns, and in relation to the risks of the transplant that 
would partially heal them. It also plainly rested on the view that, in the 
circumstances, the girls’ parents should have the right to re-allocate 
resources within the family.214 
The intra-child or intra-family balancing approach has a lot of 
intuitive appeal because it reflects how we typically operate, that is, how 
 
 208 Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 390 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972). 
 209 Id. 
 210 Nathan v. Farinelli, No. 74-87 Equity 11, slip op. 491, 501 (Mass. July 3, 1974) (on file 
with author). 
 211 Id.  
 212 Id. at 493. 
 213 See supra notes 160–70 and accompanying text (detailing the process in In re S.C.). 
 214 Id. 
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routine and reasonable decisions are made within the family. For 
example, the child with a particular talent, illness, or deficiency will 
often get more of the family’s resources than his sister who makes no 
particular demands on those resources; and the child who runs into the 
street or who falls into a river will generally command her parent’s full 
attentions even though it means neglecting (in the colloquial rather than 
legal sense of the term) her less immediately-needy brother. These are 
things we do, and in general we do them because we believe that when 
there is a choice to be made—perhaps particularly in an emergency 
setting—it makes sense to make it based on what will do the most good 
or where the need is most clear-cut. 
The power of this explanation for the persistence of pediatric 
sibling transplants is limited, however, by the fact that it reflects an 
incomplete description of fiduciary theory and the best interests test, 
and because it posits a lawless choice in this context. It is true that 
discussions and applications of fiduciary theory and the best interests 
test tend to contemplate a parent-child dyad where the only conflict of 
interest that might arise is a conflict between the parent’s interests and 
those of her child; in other words, fiduciary theory and the best interests 
test have not been developed as tools to resolve conflicts of interest 
within the family where there are multiple children with diverse 
interests.215 However, although this may be problematic if one looks at 
these principles only in their aspirational form, their real world 
application makes clear that they do contemplate such situations. That 
is, fulfillment of the best interests of the child standard does not actually 
“require[] selfless dedication to the ideal best interests of the 
child. . . . [P]arents . . . have legitimate competing interests to balance 
and reality-driven circumstances to contend with, and thus, inevitably 
and lawfully will fall short of that ideal.”216 At the same time, application 
of these principles requires the drawing of an absolute line at the point 
where intra-child or intra-family decisionmaking within this framework 
results in child maltreatment. This means that parents actually have a lot 
of leeway to make decisions that are favorable to one child and 
detrimental to another, so long as the detriment does not transcend 
these boundaries.217 
Relatedly, these principles tell us much more than simply how to 
resolve conflicts between a parent and her child. They also tell us 
something about how we should think about the child herself, and about 
 
 215 See supra notes 206–14 and accompanying text (discussing this flaw in fiduciary theory). 
 216 Coleman, supra note 12, at 617; see also BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 206, at 236 
(noting that “even as a guidance principle, the best interest[s] principle is to serve only as a 
regulative ideal, not as a strict and literal requirement, because parents’ obligations toward their 
other children as well as their own legitimate self-interests can conflict with doing what 
maximizes the child’s well-being, and sometimes may take precedence over it”). 
 217 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303–04 (1993). 
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the limits to parental decisionmaking and conduct that flow from that 
concept. Specifically, they tell us that as parents contemplate their 
choices, the child must be considered as a person in her own right, 
including with respect to her bodily integrity. And the doctrine that 
flows from this particular idea is emphatic that respecting the child’s 
bodily integrity denies the parent the right to go so far as to cut (or 
bruise or poison) her intentionally, unless it is for her own benefit.218 
Because of this, the argument that the decision whether to remove 
a healthy child’s organ to benefit an ill child is just like other hard 
decisions made in multi-child families is difficult to sustain. It sets up a 
false choice between saving or ameliorating the life of one child and 
removing the organ of another. A parent only has the right to save her 
child’s life, and a court or a surgeon only has the right to help her, by 
lawful means. So, while she may want (rationally and/or instinctively) to 
do whatever is in her power to save her dying child, the fact is that she 
cannot balance competing interests and, based on that analysis, 
“choose” to use her adult child, her sister’s child, or a friend’s child to 
accomplish her goal. If these are her only “choices,” she has no choices. 
A similarly-motivated surgeon or judge who wants to use the ill child’s 
parent’s organ is also stuck without options if the parent declines to 
sacrifice her bodily integrity for this purpose; because the parent’s rights 
to bodily integrity and to autonomous decisionmaking are absolute, a 
“donation” from them cannot be compelled. In law at least—and here, 
again, I speak of maltreatment law as it is used to establish the existing 
boundaries of family privacy—the so-called “choice” to use her own 
healthy minor child similarly does not exist. 
Thus, although interests balancing may be persuasive as a 
description of how ordinary decisions are made within the family, it 
does not provide a basis for a parental right to make any number of 
extraordinary decisions that are unlawful according to established 
boundaries. Specifically, it does not provide a basis for the extraordinary 
right, first set out in Hart and repeated in Farinelli, of a parent to 
consider among her options removing an organ from her healthy child 
to benefit an ill sibling.219 Standing alone, it does not explain why 
nontherapeutic organ removal is not prohibited, or how (in terms of our 
norms and aspirations) we justify expanding the boundaries of family 
privacy to give a parent this particular option. 
The second and more plausible explanation for the persistence of 
pediatric sibling transplants, and specifically of the view that parents 
 
 218 See supra notes 184–216 and accompanying text. 
 219 Other extraordinary decisions that would fit within this analysis include that of a parent 
to deprive one of her children of necessaries (food, shelter, medical care) as a way to ensure the 
success of her other child, and to force one of her children to work to support her other child’s 
educational opportunities. 
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ought to be able to make this choice, is based in a set of informal social 
norms and aspirations about family and relationships within the family 
that are only incompletely captured by fiduciary theory and related 
doctrine. Thus, some scholars have implied that expanding the 
boundaries of family privacy to allow parents to remove a healthy child’s 
organ to benefit an ill sibling can be justified (and acceptability of the 
practice explained) if fiduciary theory and its individually-focused best 
interests test are scrapped in favor of a “unit” theory of the family or an 
“interdependence” and “obligations” theory of intra-family 
relationships. 
For example, George Annas, Leonard Glantz, and Barbara Katz 
have suggested that “[t]he transplant cases revolve around the power of 
the family to protect its own members. When a child is sick the family as 
a unit is permitted to use its resources and make sacrifices to help the 
sick member.”220 And Michael Morley has argued that 
[f]amilies, especially immediate families, are fundamental units in 
our society, and to treat each member as a self-interest-maximizer is 
to misconstrue the nature of familial relations. Many important 
decisions are normally made based on the best interests of the 
family . . . . Family members regularly are called upon to sacrifice for 
each other, and parents are most often the ones responsible for 
managing the allocation of burdens and responsibilities. . . . 
In ruling that a court may not compel an unwilling, competent 
individual to become an organ donor, a Pennsylvania court 
accurately noted, “Our society, contrary to many others, has as its 
first principle, the respect for the individual, and that society and 
government exist to protect the individual from being invaded and 
hurt by another.” However accurate this depiction of the relationship 
among individuals in society at large may be, it would be a gross 
distortion to characterize familial relationships in a similar manner. 
Family members—parents, children, adolescents, and adult 
incompetents living under their care—owe responsibilities toward 
each other that do not exist among members of society at large. 
The Pennsylvania court went on to declare, “For a society which 
respects the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular 
vein or neck of one of its members and suck from it sustenance for 
 
 220 GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION: THE 
SUBJECT’S DILEMMA 87 (1977). These authors suggest that “the power of the family to protect its 
own members” is the real motivation behind the sibling transplant cases: “The courts that 
permit transplants have gone through incredible feats of mental gymnastics, such as finding 
benefit where none exists, to overcome [this] general rule.” Id. And they argue that “[t]he 
Farinelli case, tired of these maneuvers, directly confronted the issue and held that the family 
could protect its members, and made the decision on that basis.” Id. See supra notes 95–111 and 
accompanying text (discussing Farinelli); see also Loken, supra note 24, at 1158 (developing the 
idea of “obligations” among family members, particularly parental obligations). 
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another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought concepts of 
jurisprudence.” Notwithstanding the harsh and unappealing rhetoric 
with which this sentiment is expressed, such interdependence is an 
essential feature of families.221 
No one has developed this idea further, at least not in this context.222 A 
fuller account, one which could explain why people believe that 
removing an organ from a healthy child to benefit an ill sibling is an 
appropriate exercise of parental (and sometimes also judicial) authority, 
might go something like this: 
The family as a unit or entity is generally held to be essential to the 
society institutionally, and to individuals relationally. To the extent that 
it needs explanation and grounding, this view finds ample support in 
political philosophy, natural law, evolutionary biology, and 
psychology.223 Many things contribute to the family’s essential nature in 
 
 221 Morley, supra note 207, at 1243–44 (footnotes omitted) (quoting McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. 
D. & C.3d 90, 91 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1978)). 
 222 A few scholars have developed related theories of the family without regard to sibling 
transplants. See, e.g., Dailey, supra note 13, at 967 & n.29 (describing historical construction of 
the family as a unit which “operate[s] according to the private virtues of love, altruism and 
dependence,” and citing a related view that “‘[t]he morality of altruism has been supposed to 
animate the family to the same extent that the morality of individualism has been supposed to 
pervade the marketplace’” (citation omitted)); Fineman, supra note 10, at 1220–21 (arguing that 
“confer[ring] autonomy on caretaking or dependency units” rather than on individuals within 
such units, is most likely to ensure “collective responsibility for dependency”); Loken, supra 
note 24, at 1200 (suggesting that intra-family obligations arise out of gratitude for prior gifts 
given); Martha Minow, All in the Family & in All Families: Membership, Loving, and Owing, 95 
W. VA. L. REV. 275 (1993) (interdependence and obligation; intra-family obligations arise out of 
the relationship; note that she asks but does not attempt to answer the question how sibling 
transplants would fare according to this theory of the family); Teitelbaum, supra note 15, at 
540–42, 544 (describing “conventional understandings of the family” including as a “‘unit’” or 
“‘entity’” which “reflects both the internal governance of the family and its relation to other 
governmental units”; criticizing this understanding as “[un]convincing under modern 
conditions”); id. at 552 (noting that family members “are . . . expected to give gifts and provide 
services to each other that they are not expected to give or provide to others and are, in some 
sense, encouraged to do so”). 
 223 See, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 285 (N.Y. 1976) (“The nature of human 
relationships suggests overall the natural workings of the child-rearing process as the most 
desirable alternative.”); Loken, supra note 24, at 1162 (quoting John Locke, “Adam and Eve, 
and after them all Parents were, by the Law of Nature, under an obligation to preserve, nourish, 
and educate the Children, they had begotten, not as their own Workmanship, but the 
Workmanship of their own Maker, the Almighty, to whom they were to be accountable for 
them.”); id. at 1137 (“[O]n a subconscious, biological level we may be programmed to 
maximize our ‘reproductive success,’ by parenting in such a way as to produce the maximum 
number of healthy descendants.”); id. at 1143 (“The difficulty of fulfilling parental duties for 
more than one child goes far beyond the initial question of procreation. Some children need 
more from a parent to survive or thrive, but other children may seem to a parent worth more in 
terms of their likely overall contribution to the general welfare, however defined. Consider the 
wrenching choices faced by parents who have a badly disabled or catastrophically ill child, as 
well as one or more healthy ones.”); id. at 1189 (quoting Plato, “This is how every mortal 
creature perpetuates itself. It cannot, like the divine, be still the same throughout eternity; it can 
only leave behind new life to fill the vacancy that is left in its species by obsolescence. This . . . is 
how the body and all else that is temporal partakes of the eternal; there is no other way. And so 
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these respects, but most central is its ability and willingness to nurture 
or at least to sustain its members. Whether this function is examined 
from the perspective that the family is an organic unit whose members 
exist at least in part for the benefit of the whole, or from the perspective 
that the family is a collection of interdependent individuals who have 
mutual obligations of care and support, it contemplates individuals who 
“do their share” as they are able toward the best interests of the 
collective and of needy individuals within it.224 It also contemplates 
individuals who (at least to a point) sacrifice their selfish interests to 
help secure the lives especially, but also the general welfare, of their 
relatives.225 
These sacrifices may be physical because, within the family, bodily 
integrity is not privileged to the same extent as the preservation of life, 
relationships, or even parental prerogatives.226 (Of course, this is not the 
case vis à vis the outside world.)227 In fact, sacrifices and losses of 
physical integrity within the family might be considered both 
commonplace and expected. Depending upon one’s point of view, they 
include women bearing children and suffering the pains and risks of 
childbirth and even breast-feeding, men and women working in 
physically detrimental and high-risk jobs to support the family or to 
spare its other members from exposure to detriment and risk,228 and 
children suffering the pains of corporal punishment and foregoing 
educational and other opportunities to contribute their physical labor to 
a family enterprise. 
Moreover, the sacrifices may be made by or required of any family 
member who has something to give, including young children, because 
neither autonomy nor choice are relevant in the circumstances. This is 
 
it is no wonder that every creature prizes its own issue, since the whole creation is inspired by 
this love, this passion for immortality.” (alteration in original)). 
 224 Minow, supra note 222, at 320 n.166. 
 225 Examples of such intra-family sacrifices abound, including men who repeatedly re-
enlisted for duty during the Vietnam War to ensure that their brothers would not be called 
up—based in the law that prohibited the government from conscripting more than one sibling 
at a time; and adult children who make personal sacrifices to take care of elderly parents. 
 226 This norm should not insulate parents who (ab)use their children in ways—e.g., sexual or 
physical—that bear no relation to the best interests of the family or to the legitimate needs of 
individuals within the family. On the other hand, it should insulate parents who (ab)use their 
children to gain an important benefit for the child herself (e.g., one view of corporal 
punishment, of religious exemptions to medical neglect laws, and of other non-therapeutic 
surgeries, e.g., gender re-assignment). 
 227 See supra notes 184–203 and accompanying text (discussing the notion of bodily integrity 
and its sacrosanct place in American jurisprudence, including as this jurisprudence has 
influenced the development of child maltreatment law); see also Coleman, supra note 12, at 623 
(rejecting the view prevalent among some pediatric bioethicists that healthy children owe a 
duty to society at large to participate as research subjects in more than minimal risk research 
that may yield benefits to their population sub-group). 
 228 Other examples of sacrifices and consequent losses of physical integrity include working 
in physically debilitating and high-risk jobs to spare others from having to do such work. 
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because intra-family relations exist outside of the liberal, individualistic 
paradigm within which these principles operate.229 This analysis is not 
altered by the fact that modern medicine has made it possible even for 
infants to “do their share”—by “giving” cord blood or bone marrow, for 
example—where previously these youngest of children could only be 
characterized as dependent. By definition, age (as a proxy for individual 
decisionmaking capacity) is irrelevant in the equation. Family members 
are interdependent and expected to sacrifice for one another according 
to their abilities and the needs of the others.230 External variables, 
including the state of medical knowledge, have always affected their 
options—that is, what they are in fact able to do for one another, and 
thus the nature of their interdependence.231 
Finally, the ability and willingness of the family to nurture and 
sustain its members contemplates that parents will manage the system 
that makes the necessary allocations, because among the parties who 
could make the decisions—the child, the parents, and the state—parents 
are best suited to assume this role.232 The pre-competent child cannot be 
asked to do so because she lacks the experience and judgment necessary 
to assure sound decisionmaking not only for herself, but also in the 
interests of those around her. And the state lacks both the capacity and 
political status to micro-manage intra-family relations. Parents, on the 
other hand, have both the capacity (by virtue of their maturity and 
knowledge, including in particular about their children) and the 
political status (based in accepted ideas of parents as property owners or 
fiduciaries) to do this work.233 
As applied to the pediatric transplant setting, these informal norms 
and aspirations about family suggest that all healthy individuals 
including young children ought to be available and, whenever capacity 
 
 229 Fineman, supra note 10, at 1222 (her “argument in favor of autonomy for the caretaking 
unit is that some relationships should be considered outside of the equality paradigm”); Morley, 
supra note 207, at 1243–44 (arguing that while liberal principles properly govern the 
relationship between individuals and the state, they are irrelevant to intra-family governance 
and in particular to the propriety of intra-family organ sharing). 
 230 It is impossible to avoid the reflection that this description of the family and of intra-
family relationships sounds a lot like the communist principle “[f]rom each according to his 
ability, to each according to his needs.” KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAMME 27 
(1875). That communism has been rejected in the United States as a political philosophy which 
would govern the individual’s relationship to the state says little about how Americans imagine 
the political philosophy which governs the family as a unit. 
 231 Other variables that have the same effect on the range of family members’ ability to help 
one another survive and succeed include physical capacity and geography. 
 232 See supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text. The “parent” in this scenario may actually 
be a child, for example, where the mother and father are old and the child is the adult who 
manages their care, or where the mother and father are absent or lack relevant capacity, and the 
child, albeit a minor, is the next best option. 
 233 This analysis is entirely consistent with the way the law describes or structures the 
relationship between the state, parents, and children. See id.  
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allows it, also willing to give an organ to benefit an ill or dying family 
member. Doing so even where the transplant procedure involves 
significant injury, pain, recovery time, and long-term consequences for 
the donor can be considered merely one among many forms of 
appropriate self-sacrifice in the interests of the family and/or of a needy 
member of the group. Moreover, decisional authority in this context is 
properly rested on parents as the natural leaders of the family. As the 
Alabama probate court concluded in In re S.C., whatever the law might 
say otherwise 
the natural parents . . . of the[ ] minor children have the right to give 
their consent to the medical procedures and treatments [associated 
with the transplant] . . . in order to preserve [their injured child’s] 
life, prevent permanent physical impairment or deformity, and to 
alleviate prolonged agonizing pain.234 
To this point, I have assumed that a unit theory of the family and 
an interdependence and obligations theory of intra-family relationships 
are indistinguishable. Distinctions do exist, however, and they are not 
inconsequential: 
Most important, a unit theory of the family will countenance more 
sacrifice than will an interdependence and obligations theory of intra-
family relationships. As applied to sibling transplants, for example, one 
might argue that in a family with several small children, the health and 
wellbeing of the mother and/or father is more critical than the health 
and wellbeing, and maybe even the survival, of one of the smaller 
children. This, in turn, would suggest the propriety of taking from one 
of those smaller children what was necessary to assure her parent’s 
welfare. Presumably, this outcome would be impermissible in a family 
that is guided by principles of interdependence and obligation because, 
by definition, these principles dictate respect for and mutuality among 
the individuals who comprise the collective; that is, regardless of the 
practical implications, the small child would not be considered less 
valuable than her parent.235 
To the extent that a unit theory imagines an organic family whose 
members are in a biological, psychological, and philosophical sense all 
part of a single whole, it also suggests that removing an organ—skin, for 
example—from one member to give to another is analogous to an 
autograft (transferring skin from one to another place on a single 
person’s body). In other words, unit theories of the family blur if not 
erase entirely the line between the individual and the group, and thus 
 
 234 Order on Petition, supra note 7, at 510. 
 235 Woodhouse, supra note 11, at 1260 (“I believe we could arrive at the same place by 
focusing on individual rights of adults and children as ‘persons’ that gain added force by being 
a part of mutual relationships that are reciprocal in nature.”). 
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make it easier to rationalize the transfer. For example, because identical 
twins are part of a single whole, if an injured twin needs a large swath of 
her healthy sister’s skin either to live or simply to avoid significant 
scarring in psychologically or physically sensitive areas, the healthy twin 
needs to submit to the harvesting even if doing so results in otherwise 
unnecessary scarring of her own. This analysis is inconsistent with an 
interdependence and obligations theory of intra-family relationships 
because this theory recognizes not only the importance of family but 
also the separate integrity of its individual members and a 
corresponding limit to their intra-family obligations that is itself based 
in mutual respect for their individuality. Thus, notwithstanding their 
genetic status as identical twins, the twins are not one, they are sisters, 
and the healthy twin may not owe the injured twin a swath of skin if this 
is merely to assure to the extent possible that they continue to match. 
While I suspect that in this time and place a unit theory of the 
family is likely to be less attractive than an interdependence and 
obligations theory of intra-family relationships, in general both have 
quite a lot of appeal because they reinforce the promise that is family. 
This is perhaps especially important in this increasingly individualistic 
culture, where the dominant social norms and aspirations tend to 
emphasize each person’s separateness and thus, inevitably, each person’s 
aloneness. Children in particular (along with older and disabled adults) 
might welcome the existence of a set of strong, at least informal, norms 
that not only recognize their inevitable dependency but that also 
privilege caretaking decisions and behaviors that are designed in some 
cases literally to keep them alive, and in others simply to foster 
mutuality and interdependence among family members.236 
But there are also two important caveats as these approaches would 
be applied to the pediatric sibling transplant setting: 
First, despite the rhetoric about family unity, interdependence, and 
obligation,237 and the general sense from the cases that parents, doctors, 
and judges are primarily motivated by the desire to save the life of a 
child no matter how this is to be done, in fact it is only acceptable 
according to these informal norms and aspirations to require adult 
incompetents and little children to “donate” an organ. Older but still 
minor children may be asked or pressured to assent, but if they refuse, at 
least one of the three parties involved in the procedure (the parents, the 
doctors, or the court) will most likely decline to proceed. And no 
competent adult, no matter whether she is a parent or sibling, can be 
 
 236 MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 
(2005). 
 237 See, e.g., Morley, supra note 207, at 1244 (“Family members—parents, children, 
adolescents, and adult incompetents living under their care—owe responsibilities toward each 
other that do not exist among members of society at large.”). 
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forced even to submit to compatibility testing in this context—where 
family members seek to pressure a reluctant prospective donor, the 
medical community has developed ways to protect her, and the law 
categorically prohibits compulsion. This distinction between 
“incompetent” and “competent” family members mostly reflects the 
extraordinary strength of the society’s commitment to individual adults’ 
decisional autonomy, particularly as autonomy relates to physical 
integrity;238 the commitment to alternative norms and aspirations about 
the family is weak in comparison. Most importantly for present 
purposes, however, the difference between the way little children and 
adults are treated reflects the unique property-like power that parents 
and others are often believed appropriately to have over the children, 
including with respect to physical invasions. 
The second caveat concerning the application of informal norms 
and aspirations about family to the pediatric sibling transplant context is 
that it is not always easy to define “family.” The cases suggest that these 
norms and aspirations only apply within the original intact nuclear 
family so that “donations” can only be forced within that group. Indeed, 
even within this family, in circumstances where the harvesting surgery is 
particularly intrusive and impacting, particularly close biological and 
emotional ties—for example, those between identical twins—are 
favored.239 In contrast, absent fathers who wish to use their healthy 
children’s organs to benefit relatively unfamiliar half-siblings can be 
rebuffed,240 which suggests how slim the prospects are for others more 
distantly removed. This restriction assures that the number of children 
who are either used as or permitted to be organ sources is relatively low 
in comparison to what it would be otherwise; depending upon one’s 
view of and goals with respect to pediatric sibling transplants, this may 
be a good thing. On the other hand, as Martha Albertson Fineman has 
acknowledged in a more general context, the “entity version[] . . . [of] 
family privacy” suffers from “the historic doctrinal limitation that it 
applies primarily to family units that conform to ideological 
conventions about appropriate form and function—intact nuclear 
families.”241 In other words, it is inconsistent with progressive and 
increasingly accepted social norms about family form and also with the 
more complicated lives people increasingly live. And yet if one were to 
imagine expanding the notion of family to accommodate this variety of 
functional family forms as some commentators suggest,242 
 
 238 See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text (describing this commitment). 
 239 See, e.g., Masden v. Harrison, No. 68651 (Mass. Eq. June 12, 1957) (decision on file with 
author); Order on Petition, supra note 7.  
 240 See, e.g., Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990). 
 241 Fineman, supra note 10, at 1216. 
 242 See, e.g., id. at 1221 (proposing that autonomy and privacy should be “confer[red] . . . on 
caretaking or dependency units. . . . defined through [their] function[], not [their] form”). 
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circumscribing the universe of potential pediatric “donors” would 
become that much more complicated, especially as biological 
compatibility becomes decreasingly significant.243 
C.     The Dilemma Posed by the Status Quo 
The strength of informal norms and aspirations about the family as 
a unit or group of interdependent, mutually-obligated individuals goes 
far toward explaining the persistence of pediatric sibling transplants. 
(The remainder of the explanation is likely factual: Medicine makes it 
possible to engage in organ transfers and many adults continue to 
believe they have property-like power over little children.) The law’s 
concept of the child as an individual worthy of fiduciary protection, 
particularly with respect to her bodily integrity, explains the necessary 
sub rosa nature of the practice. These explanations are instructive, 
particularly because pediatric sibling transplants take place at the 
intersection of law and medicine where philosophical and ethical 
collisions are both a commonplace and commonly misunderstood.244 
The status quo that exists because of the particular collision at issue 
here—law that is different on the books than it is on the ground and 
decisionmaking in the latter context that is necessarily hidden from 
public view—is both practically and normatively problematic: 
It is practically problematic because in most cases it leaves affected 
parties without a coherent answer to the question whether it is legally 
permissible to perform a pediatric sibling transplant. Most important, it 
leaves healthy children who would be used as organ sources without the 
protections one would expect from law developed and applied in the 
open. Although thoughtful, respected pediatric ethicists have established 
good protocols delineating the conditions under which a child may be 
used as an organ source, these protocols are neither binding nor subject 
to external review; a particular hospital or transplant team has the 
choice to abide by them or not.245 
The status quo is normatively problematic because of the blurry if 
not invisible line that is thus drawn—in this case between permissible 
and impermissible surgeries and ultimately between conduct that is 
within and beyond the boundaries of family privacy. In these 
circumstances law loses its expressive function except to the extent that 
 
 243 See, e.g., ABO Incompatibility in Transplants, CEDARS-SINAI, http://www.cedars-
sinai.edu/Patients/Programs-and-Services/Comprehensive-Transplant-Center/Kidney-and-
Pancreas/Conditions-and-Treatments/ABO-Incompatibility-in-Transplants.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2014) (noting that “innovative new procedures allow the transplant team to break the 
ABO incompatibility barrier”). 
 244 See Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 122 (discussing these collisions). 
 245 See infra notes 286–88 and accompanying text (evaluating these protocols). 
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it announces the absence of rules beyond the good faith or ethical 
grounding of the adults in the equation. The immunity and flexibility 
that results are certainly valued by the adults and institutions (including 
hospital risk managers and general counsels) who are involved in 
pediatric sibling transplants, but it is difficult to make the case that the 
most vulnerable parties in the mix are properly served. 
III.     SETTING THE BOUNDARIES OF FAMILY PRIVACY 
Parents use of minor children as organ sources for their ill and 
injured siblings tests the boundaries of family privacy in unique ways. 
Unlike other things parents do that cause their children harm, pediatric 
sibling transplants are at once prohibited by the law and the fiduciary 
norms and aspirations that dictate its terms and permitted by powerful 
competing informal norms and aspirations about family and also 
perhaps about children as property. This state of affairs suggests that 
society is conflicted not only about the location of the boundaries of 
family privacy, but also in the first instance about the tools that it is 
prepared to use to set them. As I note at the end of Part II, the effects of 
this situation are both practical and normative, and most are negative: 
The legal status of pediatric sibling transplants is hazy at best; healthy 
children who would be used as organ sources are left without the 
protections one would expect from rules that are developed and 
administered in the open; and ultimately the law expresses only 
dysfunction. 
In this last part of the Article I agree with scholars who have 
preceded me that the boundaries of family privacy ought to be drawn 
using fiduciary theory. I join the sometimes-controversial claim that 
fiduciary theory requires the law and legal doctrine to respect not only 
the child’s physical integrity but also her emotional and developmental 
welfare, including her evolving personhood. And I argue that as applied 
to pediatric sibling transplants, this requires the law expressly to 
recognize the fact of pediatric sibling transplants in all of their possible 
forms and to adopt rules that will consistently and adequately protect 
the interests of the child who would be used as an organ source. 
A.     Defining the Boundaries According to Fiduciary Theory 
Scholars in this modern period generally agree that those who take 
care of children, including their parents and their parents’ delegates, are 
or should be guided in their decisionmaking by fiduciary principles. 
They do not all use this term, and they disagree about how exactly to 
characterize the parent-child relationship and in particular about 
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whether the child ought to be recognized as having “rights” as against 
her parents in cases of intra-family conflict.246 Notwithstanding their 
differences, however, they agree that 
the child is no longer as she was throughout much of Western 
history—the equivalent of property or else a mere extension of her 
parents who could do with her as they wished. . . . Rather, the child 
today is an individual, albeit a preautonomous one, to whom her 
parents and society owe basic obligations of nurture and respect. An 
important aspect of this modern vision is that the child’s body and 
mind are ultimately her own, not to be used to her detriment by the 
adults who are responsible for her care and development. To the 
contrary, her parents’ right to exercise discretion in the ways they 
guide her along the path to adulthood is directly tied to the 
fulfillment of their fiduciary obligations of nurture and respect, 
including to the development of a relationship with her that honors 
these commitments.247 
With some notable exceptions, this theoretical approach appears to be 
shared by pediatric bioethicists and others in the medical and scientific 
communities who view the child as the patient and the requirement of 
proxy (parental) consent as protective of her individual best interests.248 
This concept of the child and account of the parent-child 
relationship have their origins in two related revolutions: The political 
individuation of the child beginning in the late 1800s and the 
development of a science-based model of child development beginning 
in the mid-to-late 1900s.249 The former made it inevitable that children 
would come to be seen as individuals, still inextricably tied to but also 
clearly distinct from their parents and the society, and that, at the very 
least, questions would be asked about the nature of their separate status 
within the democracy. The latter has assured both that this status 
continues to be different from that of adults and that children are 
entitled to care that corresponds with their developmental needs and 
interests. 
The boundaries of family privacy that are established according to 
fiduciary theory are different from those that obtained in previous 
 
 246 See Coleman, supra note 12, at 615 (citing Scott & Scott, supra note 16, at 2402–03; 
Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 313–18); id. at 616 n.387 (citing Bartlett, supra note 24, at 297–
98). 
 247 Id. at 615–16 (footnotes omitted); see also Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 281 (N.Y. 
1976) (“[T]he modern principle [is] that a child is a person, and not a subperson over whom 
the parent has an absolute possessory interest. A child has rights too, some of which are of a 
constitutional magnitude.” (citations omitted)). 
 248 See, e.g., COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 29, at 1–2; Ramsey, supra 
note 24; Lainie Friedman Ross, Health Care Decisionmaking by Children: Is It in Their Best 
Interest?, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 41 (1997). But see Loretta M. Kopelman, Children and 
Bioethics: Uses and Abuses of the Best-Interests Standard, 22 J. MED. & PHIL. 213 (1997). 
 249 See generally Buss, supra note 22, passim. 
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periods where entity theories of the family and concepts of the child as 
property were predominant. Parents and their delegates are no longer 
believed to be entitled to cause harm to children that is not in the 
children’s own (as opposed to the family’s or the parents’) best 
interests.250 This condition inevitably restricts the kinds and degrees of 
permissible harm that may be caused, and also the nature of the 
exceptions that can be developed.251 
These restrictions, and the embedded concept of the child as a pre-
autonomous person deserving of society’s respect and protection, 
themselves are rightly privileged—the boundaries of family privacy 
ought to be located according to the coordinates they dictate. It is 
undoubtedly in the interests of children (and other vulnerable members 
of a society) that the society establish policies and laws that are 
consistent with a sense of their vulnerability and a commitment to their 
protection. Such policies and laws are also in the interests of society 
itself: Practically, respect for and protection of children and other 
individuals within vulnerable sub-populations maximizes the likelihood 
that they will flourish as persons and thus that they can become 
successful, contributing members of the society. Ethically, such respect 
and protection are indicators of a mature, confident society that does 
not abide the easy erasure of the interests of weaker individuals by those 
who are in positions of power. 
The boundaries of family privacy that are established according to 
these norms and aspirations should not be ignored simply because 
adults sometimes have competing interests; indeed, the doctrines that 
operationalize these boundaries draw a firm line beyond which they 
cannot go, regardless of their motivations, precisely because their 
conflicting interests have historically caused children significant harm. 
Thus, parents who needed or wanted free labor or money could use or 
lease out their children with impunity when the child was viewed as 
property or even as one with his parents and family.252 According to 
these same norms and aspirations, it was no stretch for parents and their 
delegates also to (ab)use and neglect the children’s bodies and minds, 
for theirs was the right and the power.253 It is important in this respect 
that, like the interest in saving or ameliorating the life of an ill or injured 
child, adults’ competing interests in these prior periods—running a 
family farm or business, funding its operations, and sustaining 
entrenched hierarchies—were often not only normative but laudable; 
adults often (ab)used children for good reasons. 
 
 250 See supra notes 18–28 and accompanying text (describing the connection between 
fiduciary theory and the best interest presumption and test). 
 251 See supra notes 186–97 and accompanying text (setting out the rules that result). 
 252 See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text (describing this effect). 
 253 Id. 
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There are differences, of course, between a property theory of the 
child and an entity or interdependence and obligations theory of the 
family and intra-family relations: Presumably the former would justify 
outright destruction whereas the latter would not. But to the extent that 
both allow for a range of treatment, from the child as treasure to the 
child as organ source—and the latter either according to Jodi Picoult’s 
My Sister’s Keeper254 or Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go255—even 
entity and interdependence and obligations theories of the family and 
intra-family relationships risk too much. As others have noted before 
me, 
to speak of the family as having its own goals and purposes and to 
speak of the familial perspective and familial objectives is to engage 
in dangerous reification. . . . Given the very great inequality of power 
between parents and children, reference to the family’s interest or 
“familial objectives” is all too likely to serve as a cover for the parents’ 
interests precisely in those cases in which the latter conflict with 
those of the child.256 
In any event, as I will argue in the next section, it is better to consider 
the more appealing aspects of entity and interdependence and 
obligations theories of the family, and of intra-family relationships 
within a fiduciary framework—for example, in the context of a best 
interests analysis—by taking into account the child’s developing 
personhood and the role of her family members in that development. In 
this respect I agree with Barbara Bennett Woodhouse that 
 
 254 JODI PICOULT, MY SISTER’S KEEPER (2005) (portraying a child who was conceived to be a 
stem cell donor for her sister, who was periodically used as an organ source after the original 
“donation,” and who was loved by her parents and treated as a full member of the family). 
 255 KAZUO ISHIGURO, NEVER LET ME GO (2005) (portraying children cloned from their 
relatives and raised apart from them so that they could eventually harvest their organs without 
the need to address emotional and relational ties). 
 256 BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 206, at 236–37. As Lee Teitelbaum has noted, the idea 
of  
the family unit in its “entity” or anthropomorphic form leaves little space for 
recognizing individual claims—the interests that arise from a wide range of 
individualized decisions and arrangements—within a family. Respect for the 
“privacy” of the family unit seemingly requires ignoring other, possibly competing, 
bearers of rights—the individual family members. 
Teitelbaum, supra note 15, at 554; see also Dailey, supra note 13, at 981 (“Individual autonomy 
and communal family life are compatible only so long as family life remains harmonious. 
When family consensus breaks down, and family members either voluntarily seek or are legally 
required to seek public resolution of their differences, constitutional protection for the family 
unit becomes problematic.”); Scott & Scott, supra note 16, at 2473 (“Conflicting signals are sent 
by a legal regime that emphasizes parental rights as well as the welfare of the child, but links the 
two by balancing the one against the other. It is not surprising that this is understood to mean 
that when parental rights are vindicated, children’s welfare is sacrificed.”). 
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[i]n rejecting the ‘entity’ or ‘unit’ as a governing paradigm [we] do 
not mean to deny the importance of relationships to family theory or 
to claim that ‘the family’ is no more than a casual grouping of 
isolated individuals. But there are better ways to express the truth of 
family connectedness, ways that do not subsume the child’s identity 
and agency.257 
The argument in favor of fiduciary theory as the basis to draw lines 
beyond which parents and their delegates cannot go also has a 
pragmatic basis. It is unrealistic to think that law and policy in this 
period can be made to recognize the primacy of approaches that re-
imagine the child as property or even as subsumed within a family that 
disregards her status as an individual worthy of respect in her own right. 
Constitutional doctrine, federal and state statutory law, and the states’ 
common law are all uniform in their commitment to the born child as 
an individual whose interests are carefully delineated and whose proxies 
are limited accordingly.258 Although state law is malleable to some 
extent, it is ultimately subject to the supremacy of federal law;259 and 
although the latter affords parents significant liberty, the rebuttable 
presumption is that they will exercise that liberty according to first 
principles: in the best interests of the child.260 
B.     Adopting a Holistic Approach to Fiduciary Theory 
Although fiduciary theory is established as the basis to draw the 
boundaries of family privacy, its particulars are subject to discussion. 
That is, scholars and policymakers can and do usefully debate what it 
means to act responsibly toward the child, including the aspects of the 
child’s welfare that are subject to respect and protection. For purposes of 
this Article, the most salient features of that debate concern the extent to 
which the child’s physical integrity is privileged and the ambivalence 
that characterizes the treatment of her emotional and developmental 
integrity. 
Consistent with the way law and policy treat adults, children’s law 
and policy focus on the child’s physical welfare. Tort and maltreatment 
law protect the child from personally unnecessary batteries, including 
those that would be inflicted by her parents and their delegates. The 
privileges or exceptions that define the batteries that count as necessary 
are scarce: Only medical treatment and reasonable corporal 
punishment, both of which are focused on the best interests of the child 
 
 257 Woodhouse, supra note 11, at 1259. 
 258 See Coleman, supra note 12, at 545–52. 
 259 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 260 See supra notes 187–97 and accompanying text (describing this doctrine). 
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herself, are formally recognized.261 There is often conflict about the 
nature and degree of physical harm that should justify the state’s 
intrusion on family privacy to protect the child according to these 
rules,262 but the fundamental commitment to the child’s physical welfare 
is beyond dispute. 
In contrast, law and policy are at least ambivalent about the child’s 
emotional and developmental welfare. There are certainly times when 
important competing interests are demoted, particularly in favor of 
children’s educational development. (Here it is appropriate to cite to 
Brown v. Board of Education, which privileged African-American 
children’s right to an integrated education and to the associated 
psychological and developmental benefits above the white citizenry’s 
interest in separation of the races in public institutions.)263 But mostly, 
children’s law and policy mirror the law’s general disdain for things 
emotional. Thus, although tort law no longer immunizes parents and 
their delegates from liability for intentional torts, one would be hard 
pressed to develop a viable claim for “emotional battery” or “intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.”264 Maltreatment law lists “emotional 
abuse” and sometimes also “emotional neglect” as legally recognized 
harms that provide the basis for state intervention into the family to 
protect the child, but these are both severely defined and rarely used on 
their own; to the extent they are the basis for state action, it is generally 
as appended to a charge of physical harm.265 Finally, although 
constitutional doctrine does suggest (mostly implicitly) that aspects of 
the child’s developing personhood are subject to protection,266 unlike 
 
 261 See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text (describing this doctrine and its 
commitments). 
 262 See, e.g., Coleman et al., supra note 119, at 113–19 (setting out the states’ different 
approaches). 
 263 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that 
although the state could require children’s attendance in some schools, it could not bar parents 
from choosing an otherwise legitimate private institution); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923) (holding that the state could not bar parents from providing their children with an 
education in part in German, but it could require parents to send their children to some 
school). 
 264 See generally G. Steven Neeley, The Psychological and Emotional Abuse of Children: Suing 
Parents in Tort for the Infliction of Emotional Distress, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 689, passim (2000). 
 265 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(c) (West 2014). 
 266 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (recognizing the right of a mature minor to 
consent, with judicial oversight, to an abortion and the significance of the decision whether to 
bear and raise a child to the minor’s construction of her future); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 
(1979) (recognizing a child’s interest in being free from involuntary institutionalization and the 
significance of such institutionalization for the child’s construction of his reputation and 
dignity); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (recognizing children’s right 
to religious expression and the significance of religion to their families’ construction of their 
identities). 
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physical harm267 and apart from the education268 and adolescent 
reproductive autonomy269 cases, this interest has not been the basis for 
intervention in the family to protect the child from parentally-inflicted 
harm. 
It is understood that emotional injuries can cut as deeply and be as 
impacting as physical ones; yet there are good reasons for the 
government’s restraint with respect to their recognition. This is perhaps 
particularly true in the intra-family setting where the infliction of such 
injuries is ubiquitous and likely unavoidable, but where children are still 
best raised. In the case of parentally-inflicted psychological and 
developmental harm, the concerns include the conceptual problem of 
drawing a line between permissible and impermissible harm; the 
practical problem of how to evaluate and measure harm to determine if 
it meets the threshold requirements for intervention; and the fact that 
intervention in even dysfunctional families itself risks significant 
harm.270 It is this last point especially that disturbs those who are most 
protective of family privacy and that makes the claim for recognition of 
an interest in emotional and developmental welfare controversial: 
Unlike physical injuries which either exist or not and which, when they 
exist, are mostly ascertainable, emotional injuries are subject to 
speculation and problems of proof and are thus more likely to provide 
the basis for unwarranted interventions, even by officials acting in good 
faith. 
I do not intend to minimize the nature or extent of these concerns. 
However, recognizing them does not require ignoring the fact that being 
a good fiduciary to a child—acting and making decisions in her best 
interests—is meaningless as a standard of care if it ignores her 
psychological and developmental welfare.271 As proof of principle, 
simply imagine a boy whose parent takes fine care of his physical 
wellbeing at the same time that she devastates him emotionally and 
developmentally to the point where he suffers a range of disabling and 
even destructive conditions; here I intend to describe commonly 
understood environmental triggers for, among other things, severe 
 
 267 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (parental rights can be terminated 
where there is clear and convincing evidence of unfitness based on physical abuse and neglect). 
 268 See supra note 263 and accompanying text (noting some of the education cases). 
 269 See, e.g., Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 622 (providing a judicial bypass for adolescent girls seeking 
to avoid parents who would be obstacles to abortions). 
 270 See Coleman, supra note 9, at 414–19, 518–21 (emphasizing the ironic costs of state 
intervention in the family to protect the child including the emotional costs associated with 
home visits and removals). 
 271 See, e.g., Emotional Abuse, AM. HUMANE ASS’N, http://www.americanhumane.org/
children/stop-child-abuse/fact-sheets/emotional-abuse.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2014); 
Stephanie Partridge, Recognizing and Understanding Emotional Child Abuse, MORE4KIDS, 
http://safety.more4kids.info/202/signs-of-emotional-child-abuse (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
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depression and psychopathy.272 It would be dishonest to claim that this 
parent had acted as a good fiduciary in her son’s best interests, and a 
theory of the parent-child relationship that allowed for this claim would 
lack integrity. Fiduciary theory ought therefore always be described 
holistically, accounting for all-important aspects of the child’s welfare. 
To the extent that this description begs implementation problems—and 
it does—I agree with others who have argued that these can and should 
be addressed on a case-by-case basis.273 
There is a tremendous amount of literature within many 
disciplines that elaborates on what it means for a parent to account for 
the child’s psychological and developmental welfare. For purposes of 
this Article, it suffices to note the longstanding concerns about the 
short- and long-term psychological implications of being used as an 
organ source and also of not being permitted to donate. Although these 
implications have properly been described as speculative given how 
specific-to-the-circumstances emotional harm can be and also given the 
dearth of empirical data on point,274 the Texas appellate court in the 
Little case was correct that to the extent they can be ascertained, they are 
both relevant and important to consider.275 
Finally, doing this work consistent with a holistic account of 
fiduciary theory requires attention to the effects of emotional and 
developmental benefits and injuries on the child’s evolving identity or 
personhood. As Professor Emily Buss has described it, this evolution is 
“the process by which an individual develops a sense of his own values, 
interests, and abilities, and an understanding of how he relates to his 
broader world.”276 It is generally understood that “[t]he [child’s] 
personhood . . . develops [best] in a cocoon of enveloping 
relationships—a tight-linked system of support, nurturance, and 
guidance that socializes the child as a rational member of a collective 
 
 272 See, e.g., Willem H.J. Martens, The Hidden Suffering of the Psychopath, PSYCHIATRIC 
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006, available at http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/psychotic-affective-
disorders/hidden-suffering-psychopath-0 (summarizing characteristic features of a 
psychopath’s childhood and tying these to the genetic bases for psychopathy); Emotional and 
Psychological Trauma, HELPGUIDE.ORG, http://helpguide.org/mental/emotional_psychological_
trauma.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2014) (summarizing events and circumstances in childhood 
that can lead to severe depression). 
 273 See, e.g., Sana Loue, Redefining the Emotional and Psychological Abuse and Maltreatment 
of Children: Legal Implications, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 311, 320–23 (2005); Jessica Dixon Weaver, 
The Principle of Subsidiarity Applied: Reforming the Legal Framework to Capture the 
Psychological Abuse of Children, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 247, 268–69 (2011); J. Robert Shull, 
Note, Emotional and Psychological Child Abuse: Notes on Discourse, History, and Change, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 1665 (1999).  
 274 AAP Clinical Report, supra note 34, at 455–56. 
 275 See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text (noting the court’s sentiments in this 
regard). 
 276 Buss, supra note 22, at 14. This process is different from the developmental process, 
which usually refers to cognitive, social, educational, and emotional maturation. 
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group.”277 Initially, of course the child’s “collective group” is his original 
family, but over time it is also comprised of (or even replaced by) 
outsiders to the original family: peers, teachers, and other adults. This 
“matrix of sustaining and constitutive relationships[] . . . endow[] [him] 
with an intellectual, moral, and cultural inheritance.”278 Ultimately, 
though, “this same self ‘is determined to make that inheritance his own 
by fashioning an individual character and life plan, and by turning his 
participation in social practices into performances expressive of his 
individuality.’”279 What this means is that good fiduciary choices must 
take into account the child’s personhood in the moment of decision, but 
also that it is a transitional moment in her identity formation and that 
she will soon grow to be someone with additional or even different 
constitutive and deeply meaningful relationships, experiences, and 
values. 
C.     Developing Law to Govern Pediatric Sibling Transplants 
To assure that the parties are doing right by both children in a 
potential pediatric sibling transplant situation, it is necessary for the law 
to emerge from its longstanding sub rosa position, and for rules to be 
developed based in these fiduciary principles. Until it does, as the legal 
history shows, the risks are simply too high that inadequate attention 
and respect will be paid to the multiple important interests of the 
healthy minor children who would be used as organ sources. This is 
because when rules are not transparent, they can be manipulated or 
even ignored with impunity in circumstances where they appear to be 
obstacles to the desired result. In the case of pediatric sibling 
transplants, this situation is exacerbated by a misunderstanding about 
what the rules actually permit and require; and it is not remedied by 
otherwise thoughtful medical ethics guidelines because these are by 
definition non-binding and also because they are inconsistent with 
fiduciary theory in some aspects. 
 
 277 Brook K. Baker, Traditional Issues of Professional Responsibility and a Transformative 
Ethic of Client Empowerment for Legal Discourse, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 809, 875 (2000); cf. AM. 
LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 (2002); id. § 2.02 cmt. e (“[T]he continuity of existing parent-child 
attachments after the break-up of a family unit is a factor critical to the child’s well-being. Such 
attachments are thought to affect the child’s sense of identity and later ability to trust and to 
form healthy relationships.”). 
 278 Baker, supra note 277, at 875. 
 279 Id. at 875–76 (quoting STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE AND 
COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 219 (1990)). 
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The move to bring pediatric sibling transplants into the open and 
expressly within the cognizance of existing law and its fiduciary 
influences would likely have one of two “real world” effects: 
The first could be to cause states to proscribe the practice in all 
circumstances on the grounds that its necessary invasions fit squarely 
within the definition of physical abuse and that an exception would be 
unworkable because a healthy child’s interests cannot be adequately 
protected (no matter how clear the protocol) where a dying or very ill or 
injured child is the counterweight. As one judge is said to have opined, 
“with [a child’s] life at risk, no court would hold against the parents’ 
wishes and the physician’s recommendation for the harvesting 
procedures.”280 Bone marrow transplantation might be the exception if 
the case is adequately made either generally or in individual cases that 
both the physical invasions involved and the short- and long-term 
psychological and physical risks are indeed negligible.281 
The second effect of a move to bring pediatric sibling transplants 
within existing law could be to cause states to permit the practice as an 
exception to the rule that intentional serious physical harm to a child is 
prohibited abuse, but likely only in circumstances where the evidence 
was compelling that the physical and psychological harms and risks 
inherent in the harvesting would be outweighed by non-speculative 
benefits to the donor child. Given that some pediatric sibling transplants 
make sense from whatever theoretical or ethical perspective one holds, 
this second, fine-tool approach would be preferable. To take the 
simplest case again, fiduciary theory would certainly permit (and even 
encourage) a bone marrow transplant where a physically and 
emotionally healthy older adolescent in a loving and supportive 
relationship with his parents and sibling clearly wants to make the 
donation—the benefits of this process given his developmental stage, 
including to the continued positive evolution of his personhood, could 
be shown to outweigh the harms and risks inherent in the surgery. 
The standard that would govern this new exception has two critical 
components, both of which are designed to ensure that decisionmakers 
in individual cases focus their attentions on the healthy child herself; 
that they understand that their role is to protect her multifarious 
interests; and that they only permit transplants that are consistent with 
that fiduciary responsibility: 
The first of these components is its evidentiary burden, which 
requires that advocates of the transplant (usually parents and their ill or 
 
 280 See Tilden, supra note 1, at 97 (in the context of the In re S.C. discussion). 
 281 Although one might think that this has already been done given that the procedure 
appears to be commonplace, in fact only two states have been convinced to adopt laws on point 
and the American Academy of Pediatrics has only recently opined on its ethical status. See 
supra notes 122, 174–76 and accompanying text. 
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injured child’s doctors) produce child-specific evidence to support their 
claims about harms, risks, and benefits, and which demands that this 
evidence be clear and convincing before authority to conduct the 
procedure is granted. This is to counter the tendency of courts and 
hospitals to proceed on the basis of generalizations and suppositions, 
most of which are never brought home to the healthy child herself and 
which otherwise lack evidentiary support. Consistent with the 
suggestion made by Baron, Botsford, and Cole in 1975, and apparently 
accepted by most judges since then, the petitioners’ facts and the weight 
of their evidence should be challenged by an adversary to the surgery; 
this on the view that the adversarial process is an effective way to know 
the truth about the procedure and the child’s circumstances.282 “Donor 
advocates” as envisioned by some in the medical community are 
insufficient for this purpose because they are by design parties to a 
collaborative process which focuses on both of the children’s interests 
and which is deferential to parents’ wishes.283 In such conditions and 
given the context—usually fast-paced decisionmaking in the face of a 
dying child—it is a real risk that unless an individual is designated 
specifically for this purpose, no one in the process will have an interest 
in identifying facts and making arguments that would counsel against 
the transplant. As the Alabama decision in In re S.C. case suggests, 
including a good GAL for the healthy child is insufficient standing alone 
to guarantee that such evidence is treated appropriately, but the odds 
that this evidence will be suppressed, minimized, or even ignored 
inevitably increase if such a GAL is absent. 
The second is its recognition that the child’s psychological and 
developmental interests in this special context may be as significant as 
her physical interests. As I explain in Part II, the law to date has not 
generally seen fit to permit intentional physical injuries to a child where 
the only arguable benefits are psychological.284 This is in line with its 
traditional privileging of physical harms and its separate concerns about 
recognizing emotional harms.285 I believe that this view is well-taken in 
almost all other circumstances; however, it is lacking in the special case 
of pediatric sibling transplants both as a practical matter because they 
cannot proceed in the absence of evidence of psychological benefit since 
there is no (or negative) physical benefit, and as a theoretical matter 
because both allowing and disallowing a transplant can, depending on 
the facts, have extraordinarily damaging implications for the healthy 
 
 282 See supra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the GAL in judicial 
proceedings). 
 283 See id. (discussing the concept of and problems with the AAP’s construction of the 
child’s donor advocate). 
 284 See supra notes 196–97 and accompanying text (explaining this point). 
 285 See supra notes 261–70 and accompanying text (discussing this background). 
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child who would be used as an organ source. To ignore these 
implications is, again, contrary to her best interests and inconsistent 
with adults’ fiduciary obligations. 
Given the significance of the child’s developing personhood in 
particular, it is essential that the rule and process that is ultimately 
developed to assess psychological harms and benefits assures careful 
consideration of the child’s real ties to the members of her nuclear 
family but also in particular to the sibling who needs an organ, of the 
family’s relevant cultural norms and values, and of the ways and extent 
to which she has, to that point, made them her own. This rule and 
process must also assure careful consideration of the likelihood that the 
significance of these ties, norms, and values will change as she grows, 
and that others of equal or greater significance may develop. Because of 
competing obligations, changed family circumstances and relationships, 
a fear of surgery, or simply a particular sense of bodily integrity, it is not 
unusual for adult family members to decline voluntarily to donate an 
organ to an ill or injured sibling, even in otherwise loving, functional 
families. Although it is expedient both to ignore or minimize this 
possibility in a given case, and to conclude that a present-day analysis of 
the future possibilities is too difficult in any event, honest fealty to 
fiduciary principles demands that decisionmakers try their best to 
understand the child in all of these respects. 
Apart from the conditions that I have just described, developing 
the rule and process to govern a “sibling transplant exception” to the law 
prohibiting intentional physical harm to a child would not require 
policymakers or judges to begin from scratch: 
First, there is useful guidance to be drawn from the available 
pediatric sibling transplant cases, both in terms of what they got right 
and what they got wrong. Thus, most were correct—as in consistent 
with law and its fiduciary influences—to set the standard as the best 
interests of the healthy child; to use a balancing test to establish those 
best interests, which focused only on that child; and to attempt to 
ascertain the child’s emotional and developmental interests but also to 
acknowledge the difficulties inherent in that enterprise. At the same 
time, most were wrong—as in inconsistent with the law and its fiduciary 
influences—not to require an important threshold of evidence to 
support best interests arguments, since this is the only way to assure that 
these are more than just arguments; not to focus initially on the physical 
harm that is the surgical intrusion itself, since this is just as if not more 
important from the law’s perspective than the short- and long-term 
associated risks; and to assume that parental responsibility and 
authority is or should be so broad as to permit even extraordinary 
physical intrusions on a healthy child’s body so long as these are 
undertaken in good faith. 
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Second, as I have already noted, the medical community itself has 
carefully considered pediatric sibling transplants from its own 
professional and ethical perspectives and has developed protocols 
consistent with these requirements. These protocols are based in many 
shared principles and thus can provide additional guidance for the law. 
Thus, both the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA) of the 
American Medical Association (AMA) and the Committee on Bioethics 
of the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) have established the 
following “stringent criteria”286 for using healthy children as organ 
sources: that other sources or options do not exist to address the ill 
child’s circumstances; that both the healthy and the ill child will benefit 
significantly from the transplant, and specifically that the healthy child 
will benefit psychologically; that transplants only take place between 
close family members; that the transplant poses a low medical risk for 
the healthy child; and that the healthy child assent to the procedure.287 
These protocols are notable for their focus on assuring that the interests 
of the healthy child are examined carefully and honestly, on their 
insistence that every condition be met, and for their sense that this 
requirement cannot be satisfied by unsupported assertions. Like the law 
itself, these criteria are not without flaws. Most notably, neither requires 
a transparent process involving a neutral decisionmaker, and the AAP’s 
proposal in particular is (as subsequently interpreted)288 overly 
deferential toward parents’ wishes and decisions. But ultimately they 
can help to fill in some of the details of what it would mean to do “best 
interests” in this context. 
CONCLUSION 
A healthy minor child should be used as an organ donor only if there 
is compelling factual evidence that the psychological benefits to that 
child outweigh the necessary physical injuries. Such evidence will 
often be difficult, even impossible, to muster. But it is only in these 
circumstances that we can know that we are appropriate stewards of 
her mental and physical health; that we are not sacrificing her for the 
 
 286 AAP Clinical Report, supra note 34, at 456–57. 
 287 See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 29. It chose the “clear benefit” 
standard in lieu of the best interests test because it believed the latter to be “vulnerable to 
manipulation” and thus to permit “the decision maker’s own subjective values” too much 
influence in the outcome of the process. Id.; AAP Clinical Report, supra note 34; AAP Policy 
Statement, supra note 32. 
 288 See supra note 180 (discussing this deference). 
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benefit of another simply because, in the excruciating moment of 
decision, that seems like the right thing to do.289 
The law properly recognizes a right of family privacy, which 
includes a right to make decisions about the family’s culture, how its 
children will be raised, and how its relationships will be managed. It also 
properly recognizes that parents are usually best placed to make those 
decisions because they have the cognitive capacity, life experience, and 
intimate knowledge necessary to do this well. However, these rights are 
not and should not be limitless. In the modern context where the theory 
of the parent-child relationship is a fiduciary one, and where the 
concept of the child is that of a pre-autonomous person deserving of 
respect and protection, the law must set the boundaries of family 
privacy consistent with that theory and concept. 
Pediatric sibling transplants test the modern boundaries of family 
privacy in a way that perhaps no other parenting choice does: The 
harvesting surgery causes important physical harm to the healthy child 
who would be used as an organ source—harm the law normally 
characterizes as a battery and as abuse—on the basis of other-than-
fiduciary principles. That is, despite pro forma arguments about the 
harvesting being in the best interests of the donor child, long-rejected 
entity theories of the family and property theories of the family’s 
children appear to underlie decisions by judges and others to proceed 
with transplants. 
It is probably because of this disconnect that the law’s role in 
authorizing the surgeries remains sub rosa despite their prevalence. 
That is, the use of a minor child as an organ source is not a privileged 
battery, nor is it an exception to the law in every state that intentional 
physical injury to a child is abuse unless it is justified as medical 
treatment or reasonable corporal punishment. And there is a real dearth 
of case law on point; indeed, the single published decision authorizing a 
pediatric sibling transplant lacks precedential value. Nevertheless, there 
is good evidence both that judges have and continue to authorize 
transplants off the record, and that at least some hospitals are willing to 
proceed in the absence of judicial authorization on the basis of rulings 
by their internal ethics committees. 
The law ought not abdicate its legitimate line-drawing authority in 
this setting; and it ought not permit the boundaries of family privacy to 
be reset according to notions about children as property or families as 
organic entities. These notions are well-understood to pose enormous 
risks for vulnerable family members including especially children, who 
became eligible for protection from the state only when they were 
 
 289 DORIANE LAMBELET COLEMAN, GOOD QUESTION: AN EXPLORATION IN ETHICS (2011), 
available at http://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/GQ-Coleman.pdf. 
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reconceived as individuals whose dignity was valued accordingly. 
Although there may be good reasons to consider using a healthy child as 
an organ donor for her ill or injured sibling, these should not be 
permitted to trump the child’s hard-won rights unless they are clearly 
consistent with her fiduciary interests. Developing transparent, 
enforceable standards to govern the decision whether to permit a 
pediatric sibling transplant is precisely the law’s role. 
